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ABSTRACT

INTRINSIC FUNCTIONS FOR
SECURING CMOS COMPUTATION:
VARIABILITY, MODELING AND NOISE SENSITIVITY
SEPTEMBER 2016
XIAOLIN XU
B.E., UNIVERSITY OF ELECTRONIC SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY OF CHINA
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF ELECTRONIC SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY OF CHINA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Wayne P. Burleson

A basic premise behind modern secure computation is the demand for lightweight
cryptographic primitives, like identifier or key generator. From a circuit perspective, the
development of cryptographic modules has also been driven by the aggressive scalability
of complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) technology. While advancing
into nanometer regime, one significant characteristic of today’s CMOS design is the
random nature of process variability, which limits the nominal circuit design. With the
continuous scaling of CMOS technology, instead of mitigating the physical variability,
leveraging such properties becomes a promising way. One of the famous products
adhering to this double-edged sword philosophy is the Physically Unclonable Functions
(PUFs), which extract secret keys from uncontrollable manufacturing variabilities on
integrated circuits (ICs). However, since PUFs take advantage of microscopic process

vii

variations, thus many specialized issues including variability, modeling attacks and
noise sensitivity need to be considered and addressed.
In this dissertation, we present our recent work on PUF based secure computation
from three aspects: variability, modeling and noise sensitivity, which are deemed the
foundations of our study. Moreover, we found that the three factors coordinate with
each other in our study, for example, the modeling technique can be utilized to improve
the unsatisfied reliability caused by noise sensitivity, quantifying the variability can
effectively eliminate the impact from noise, and modeling can help with characterizing
the physical variability precisely.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Sophisticated semiconductor industry facilitates the design, manufacturing and fabrication of integrated circuits (IC). One significant characteristic of the complementary
metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) technology development is the persistent physical
scalability and ever-increasing usability. The scaling of CMOS techniques has helped
people to integrate more transistors into smaller sized chips, and made it possible
to realize ultra-large-scale CMOS design. This advancement favors the development
of electronic devices like smart phones, tablets and portable medical devices, but
also proposes new challenges. One example is that designers have to face new design
limitations like process variations, lower supply voltage, temperature sensitivity and
device aging, known as the PVTA issues. From another perspective, this also proposes
new requirements for the hardware security study, since malicious hardware devices
can now devastate commerce, government operation and even national defense in a
larger scale.
To enhance the computation security, many infrastructures like computer or
network server have been equipped with hardware security modules, such as a plug-in
card, which manages the digital keys for strong authentication or crypto-processing.
In contrast, due to the limited silicon or energy budget, strengthening the security of
many small embedded devices like implanted medical devices seems not an easy job. As
we are stepping into the Internet of Things (IoT) era, such small devices are ubiquitous
and all connected with the IoT network. In particular, many embedded systems are
now carrying sensitive information like user profiles or credentials, thus rendering them
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as attractive targets for malicious attackers. Therefore, in the proliferation of small
devices in the IoT era, it is urgent for people to properly address the security challenge
and protect security-critical information on these devices from various attacks.
While tiny embedded processors are becoming the central processing engines in
many portable devices, lightweight cryptographic primitives is also gaining more
attention in hardware security research. Since most of the embedded systems pose
tight constraints on area, energy and functionality, significant effort has been spent
to integrate more transistors and functionalities onto smaller chips. One challenge
in this process is that while the CMOS technology scales into nanometer regime,
designers have to consider the impact from like design uncertainty, which is introduced
by aggressive scalability. One main cause of the design uncertainty is the random
dopant fluctuation (RDF) [7], which introduces variabilities in the number of dopant
atoms in transistor channels and changes the threshold voltage of a transistor. Based
on current fabrication technology, totally eliminating such process variations is still a
difficult mission. In this scenario, constructively utilizing such phenomenon becomes
a meaningful direction. One well-known product based on this philosophy is Physical
Unclonable Function (PUF), which was firstly introduced in [102] [26] [77].
PUF can be used to substitute many conventional applications like key generator
or chip identifier. For example, one of the conventional solutions to identify IC is
using static identifiers (IDs) stored in non-volatile memory. However, such IDs are
usually composed by digital numbers and thus vulnerable to cloning. Due to the
uniqueness, physical characteristics was proposed as a new resource to build device
IDs, such physical features can be viewed as the fingerprinting of an IC, which has
the advantage of robust immutability and resistance to cloning and tampering. While
being employed as an identifier, PUF is originally described as a physically obfuscated
key [27], and more recently as a weak PUF [31].

2

As many other electronic devices, PUF design is promoted by the scaled CMOS
technology, but also challenged. In this dissertation, we present our contribution on
PUF based hardware security in nanometer CMOS regime. More specifically, we
focus on advancing reliability, security of PUFs from three perspectives: variability,
modeling attacks and noise sensitivity, which are viewed as the foundations for our
study.

1.1
1.1.1

Challenges and Opportunities
Variability

Though frequently suspected and challenged, the development of CMOS technology has been continually driven by Moore’s Law over the past decades [112] [2].
Unfortunately, as the CMOS technology steps into nanometer scale, as depicted in Fig.
1.1, the fabrication uncertainty of device has become a big problem. One important
cause of the uncertainty problem is the inability to set all device parameters to the
desired values exactly. The observable characterization of fabrication uncertainty is the
mismatched device parameters, i.e., the different threshold voltage between transistors
[107] [41]. Variability on modern chips can be classified into three categories: 1) the
variabilities between different dies, i.e., the inter-die variability have large correlation
with each other, which affects all transistors on the same die; 2) a portion of transistors
one the same die are impacted by the intra-die variability, thus are correlated over
smaller distance; and 3) random issues like dopant fluctuations affect each transistor
randomly.
From a device perspective, CMOS design based on the scaled technology is now
affected more by the variabilities like process variations, lower supply voltage, temperature and aging issues, also known as PVTA variations. Since security designs are
usually embedded in other circuits, thus are also challenged by the persistent physical
scalability and demand for increasing usability. PUF, which was firstly introduced in
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Figure 1.1: Transistor scaling trends [2].

[102], is a well-known example that constructively leverages such physical features for
security purpose.
Over the past 15 years, different variants or types of PUFs and applications
based on PUFs have emerged, as summarized in Fig. 1.2, see [91] for an overview.
They all share the above features of being a disordered structure, possessing physical
unclonability, and exhibiting some form of challenge-response mechanism. More
specifically, PUF is a function which leverages the physically variabilities like delay
variations [56], power-up state of SRAMs [36] and even optical variations [77] [89]
[83]. During the last ten years, PUFs have established themselves as an alternative
to conventional security approaches [28] [77]. In a nutshell, a PUF is a disordered,
at least partly randomly structured physical system. Due to its random structure
that is caused by uncontrollable, small-scale manufacturing variations, it is physically
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Figure 1.2: PUF is becoming a hot topic in hardware security research during the
past decade [91].

unclonable, i.e., no two specimens can be produced that are physically exactly identical.
This limitation applies to both the original manufacturer and to other, potentially
adversarial, parties. All PUFs have one basic functionality in common, namely some
challenge-response mechanism: They can be triggered by signals that are commonly
denoted as challenges Ci . Upon excitation by a challenge Ci , they react by producing a
response RCi that depends on their internal disorder and usually also on the challenge
itself. The tuples (Ci , RCi ) are called the challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of the PUF.
The two main PUF-types are often denoted as strong and weak PUFs [93] [90].
Strong PUFs are built on customized circuits, which have a very large number of
possible challenges, too many to read out all corresponding CRPs in feasible time.
Their challenge-response mechanism should be complex in the sense that it is hard to
derive unknown CRPs from a set of known CRPs. Strong PUFs are usually employed
with a publicly accessible CRP interface, i.e., anyone holding the PUF or the PUF

5

"SRAM PUF"

150

"PUF"

100
Research
Mentions
by Year 50

0
2002

2007

2013

Year
Figure 1.3: SRAM PUF has been gaining a lot of attention ever since it was proposed
[91].

embedding hardware can apply challenges and read out responses. The lack of access
restriction mechanisms on strong PUFs is therefore a key difference from weak PUFs.
In recent years, strong PUFs have turned out to be a very versatile cryptographic
and security primitive: First of all, by using a fixed set of challenges, they can be
employed for internal key derivation, just like weak PUFs. But they can do more:
They can also implement a host of advanced cryptographic protocols, ranging from
identification [77] [61] to key exchange [110] [11], key management [45] to oblivious
transfer [11], and more recently, as a keyless secure sensor [92].
In contrast, weak PUFs possess essentially a single, fixed challenge C. They are
mainly used for internal key derivation in security hardware. The underlying security
assumption is that attackers must not be able to access the internal response of
the PUF. The most well-known weak PUF example is the SRAM PUF proposed
by Holcomb et al. [36], by reading out the power-up state of the SRAM cells [31]
[37]. Though invented later than strong PUFs, SRAM PUF, as the most well-known
example in weak PUF category, has gained a lot of attention in hardware security

6

(a) An ideal SRAM cell is a symmetric architecture.

(b) An example fingerprint based on SRAM PUFs.

Figure 1.4: A 64-bit fingerprint based on SRAM PUFs. Reproduced from Holcomb
et al. [36] with permission.

study, as Fig. 1.3. Since SRAM circuitry is widely used as storage module, this makes
SRAM PUF a ideal platform to generate secret keys or device fingerprint, as shown in
Fig. 1.4b, a 64-bit fingerprint based on SRAM PUF.

1.1.2

Modeling

Modeling is a powerful method for human beings to learn the mechanisms of
nature, especially to simulate complex theories or systems [24] [48]. In most recent
literatures about PUFs, modeling is mainly employed to play a “bad” role: help with
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Figure 1.5: XOR Arbiter PUF, that is composed by n Arbiter PUFs in parallel to
improve the resistance against modeling attacks [91].

predicting the behavior of PUFs, i.e., attacking PUFs. The usual working flow of
“modeling attacks” is that, an adversary collects a subset of CRPs, uses them to train
a machine learning (ML) algorithm, and later employs the model produced by the
ML algorithm to predict unknown CRPs. Even though many possible applications
make the secure construction of secure strong PUFs a worthwhile and rewarding
research target. Unfortunately, it is a non-trivial one, since a large number of powerful
attacks on some first-generation electrical strong PUFs have been published recently,
including Machine Learning modeling attacks [93] [90]; side-channel attacks [95] [94];
and also optical characterization techniques [106]. Most of these attacks target the
first electrical strong PUF, the so-called Arbiter PUF [28] [77] and variants thereof,
for example XOR Arbiter PUFs (Fig. 1.5) and Feed-Forward Arbiter PUFs.
Though ML modeling techniques are challenging the security of strong PUFs, but
also making them the most powerful tool to learn the internal variability of PUFs
until now. That is, ML modeling technique makes it possible for people to quantify
the sub-nanometer or sub-picosecond level physical variabilities. In this thesis, we
propose two constructive utilizations of Machine Learning techniques to help with
building of robust and reliable PUFs. One of them is simulating the microscopic
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process variations of PUFs. Since PUFs are leveraging microscopic process variations,
thus it is impossible to measure many important features directly, because that any
external probing will introduce bias to PUF circuitry. For example, it is extremely
difficult to measure the delay length of Arbiter PUFs, which is of pico-second level
with current instruments.
Another constructive usage of computer modeling in this thesis is speeding up the
circuit simulation. The behavior of a transistor or circuit is determined by features
including transistor size, temperature, supply voltage, etc. Thus it will be a waste of
time to repeatedly simulating one interested feature while varying the input patterns.
In this thesis, we propose to use machine learning techniques to build up models and
speed up the simulation of data retention voltage (DRV) for SRAM circuits, which is
2.2e6 times faster than using simulation like Hspice.

1.1.3

Noise Sensitivity

Many PUF architectures have been explored in literature, including strong PUFs
like Arbiter PUF [26] [56] [29], Ring Oscillator (RO) PUF [102], Lightweight PUF [70],
and weak PUFs like SRAM PUF [36] [31]. However, since all of the proposed PUFs
are built on microscopic physical variability, thus are sensitive to noise. Reliability (see
definition in Sec. 1.2.2) is an important metric to evaluate PUFs, which reflects their
ability to produce the same response for a particular challenge despite the existence
of noise, for weak PUFs like SRAM PUF, reliability refers to the constant powerup states across different environmental conditions. Even though many meaningful
applications on PUFs have been proposed, reliability is still a problem that hinders
their practical applicability. This is because that environmental noise like power
supply (VDD ) and temperature (T ) variations is ubiquitous, and can easily overcome
the process variabilities of a silicon device.
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The environmental noise can not be avoided, since even every silicon device itself
will dissipate heat after operating for a while. Thus, the output of a PUF depends
not only on the challenge (C) but also on transient environmental conditions (e).
If denoting the input/output relationship of a PUF p with a function fp , a PUF
operating in different conditions may possibly generate a flipped response (R) to the
same challenge vector (C), as expressed in Eq.1.1.

R = fp (C, e)

(1.1)

PUFs are mainly proposed to constructing secret keys or serve as a lightweight
device identifier. According to [49], the security of most current cryptographic techniques rely on the robustness of secret keys. Thus if using PUFs to identify hardware
devices or constructing secret keys, fingerprint observations must be consistent over
time and across different environmental conditions. A fundamental concern in PUFs
is to minimize the impact of noise and environmental fluctuations while still being
sensitive to the microscopic variations that make each device unique. A common way
of minimizing the impact of noise and environment is to use differential circuits. Yet
small variations in the fingerprint of a device are inevitable, and much effort is spent
on error correction of somewhat-unreliable fingerprints or PUF outputs, or adding
significant extra circuitry for calibration [74]. However, error correcting codes and
calibration circuitry are expensive in terms of the number of raw bits and silicon
resource required to create a reliable key, and more so if a large number of errors must
be correctable.
In this thesis, we present our work that studies the noise problems on PUFs. We
propose a novel clockless sequential PUF structure that performs autonomous majority
voting to improve reliability.
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1.2
1.2.1

Terminologies of PUF
CRPs

Challenge and response are commonly used terms in computer security, which
stand for the information exchanged between two parties, specifically, challenge means
the proposed question by one party, while response is the answer provided by the other
side. Only while the question is correctly answered, the two parties can authenticate
each other, for example, supplying the correct password before logging in. In PUF
study, these two terms are borrowed to denote the input and output respectively.
As suggested by the names, PUFs can be used in two-party authentication: a set of
challenges are applied and the corresponding responses are stored in advance, only the
genuine PUF holder can provide the correct responses while being queried. Different
PUF architectures support various amount of CRPs, according to the number of
usable CRPs, PUFs can be classified into two classes: strong and weak PUFs [33] [93]
[90]. For example, the more complex physical variability makes it possible for strong
PUFs to have a large number of usable CRPs and allow free querying of responses.

1.2.2

Reliability

Since PUFs leverage microscopic process variations, thus are sensitive to environmental noise like slight temperature or supply voltage fluctuations. Due to the
sensitivity, a PUF may not produce consistent response for the same challenge under
different environmental conditions. Reliability of a PUF is defined as its capability to
reproduce the same responses while digesting the same challenge vectors. This feature
is very important in evaluating a PUF design, since most application based on PUFs
are related with security or privacy, such as authentication or key generation. A widely
used measure for reliability is intra-chip hamming distance as denoted in Eq. 1.2 [99]
[51], where the C = {C0 , C2 , C2 . . . Cn−1 } stand for a group of n challenge vectors.
The intra-chip hamming distance Distintra (C) computes the proportion of flipped
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responses in RC,e (responses under random environmental conditions e), comparing
with that in RC,ne (responses under nominal environmental condition ne).

Distintra (C) = HD(RC,ne , RC,e )

1.2.3

(1.2)

Uniqueness

Since PUF utilizes the physical variability from manufacturing, thus is supposed
to be distinguishable from each other. The metric measuring this capability of PUFs
is uniqueness, that is characterized by the inter-chip Hamming Distance Distinter (C).

Distinter (C) = HD(RiC , RjC )

(1.3)

After digesting the same challenge vectors C = {C0 , C2 , C2 . . . CN −1 }, two PUF
instances i and j will generate responses RiC and RjC respectively. The uniqueness
between these two PUF instances is calculated as Eq. 1.3, where Distinter (C) calculates
the hamming distance between RiC and RjC . Based on this definition, there will be
totally N × (N − 1)/2 uniqueness values for a group of N PUF instances. According
to the central limit theorem, if N is large enough, the distribution of uniqueness values
should be following a Gaussian style, and the ideal uniqueness should be close to 50%.

1.2.4

Uniformity

Frequency prediction is one possible attacking method on security systems, in
which the attacker collects outputs from known queries in order to build a probability
distribution for each output. An ideal security system is supposed to produces each
output bit as 0 or 1 with a probability of 0.5, which eliminates the possibility of
frequency prediction. For a hardware system like PUF, the probability of generating

12

0 or 1 is mainly determined by the circuit bias, uniformity is a metric of PUFs that
denotes such bias in a PUF design.

HW (C) =

N
−1
X

(Ri )

(1.4)

i=0

In practical, uniformity is usually denoted by fractional Hamming Weight, i.e., the
proportion of “1” responses in a set of responses, as Eq. 1.4. C = {C0 , C1 , C2 . . . , Cn−1 }
denotes a group of n challenge vectors applied on PUF, and Ri corresponds to the
response for each single challenge Ci . A good PUF is expected to have equal number
of 0 and 1 responses, i.e., a uniformity of 0.5, indicating the high unpredictability of
the design.

1.3

Background and Motivation

In previous sections, we introduced the basic definition of PUFs and some related
terminologies. We referred PUF study from three aspects: 1) physical variability
challenges conventional CMOS design but favors hardware security primitives like
PUFs; 2) modeling attacks is a main threat for PUF based applications, but also a
promising tool to study PUFs deeply; and 3) noise sensitivity limits the practical
applicability of PUFs by degrading their reliability. It it notable that, since all of the
three directions are about PUFs, thus there is intrinsic link between them, such as
the noise sensitivity is the cause of reliability problem. In the following paragraphs,
we will review some background information of the three aspects.
A wide variety of PUFs and fingerprints based on custom or pre-existing integrated
circuit components have been proposed. The identifying features used by custom
designs include MOSFET drain-current [60], timing race conditions [26], and the
digital state taken by cross-coupled logic after a reset [101]. IC identification based
on pre-existing circuitry is demonstrated using SRAM power-up state [37] [31], and
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physical variations of flash memory [78]. Lee et al. [57] derive a secret key unique
to each IC using the statistical delay variations of wires and transistors across ICs.
Circuit-level techniques for increasing the reliability of SRAM PUFs are explored by
Bhargava et al. [10]. An experimental evaluation of low-temperature data remanence
on a variety of SRAMs is provided by Skorobogatov [100], and SRAM remanence
in RFID has been studied by Saxena and Voris as a limitation to SRAM-based true
random number generation [97].
Previous works [109] have used error correction to construct secret keys from noisy
PUF sources; however, these approaches are expensive in their required number of
gates. Suh et al. use a BCH code to correct 21 errors among 127 raw bits to create a
64-bit key [104]. Guajardo et al. [31] derive a 278-bit secret key from 1,023 bits of
power-up SRAM state using a BCH code that can correct up to 102 errors. Maes
et al. [67] introduce an SRAM helper data algorithm to mask unreliable bits using
low-overhead post-processing algorithms. Recently, Yu et al. [126] proposed the use of
index-based syndrome (IBS) coding for deriving reliable key bits from PUF outputs.
A notable feature of error correction using IBS coding in PUFs is that the syndrome
does not leak information about the encoded bits. Hiller et al. extend IBS coding
for SRAM PUFs [35]. Van Herrewege et al. [111] have designed a new lightweight
authentication scheme using PUFs that does not require storage of a large number of
PUF challenge-response pairs.
Compared to the low cost of the SRAM used for DRV fingerprinting, a relatively
significant practical cost may be associated with the generation of the test voltages for
characterizing the DRVs. Emerging devices such as computational RFIDs [87] can use
software routines to extract DRVs, but as contactless devices they must generate all
test voltages on-chip. On-chip dynamic control of SRAM supply voltage is assumed
in the low-power literature at least since work on drowsy caches [25]. Supply voltage
tuning has also been applied with canary cells to detect potential SRAM failures,
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and as a post-silicon technique to compensate for process variation and increase
manufacturing yields [75] [121].
Reliability is a bottleneck that limits practical applicability of PUFs. To improve
the reliability of PUFs, techniques at system-level [18] [21], model-level [126] [63] [68]
and circuit-level [82] have been proposed. Delay based PUF is a big family, including
Arbiter PUF [26] [56] [29], RO PUF [102] and Lightweight PUF [70]. Among those
PUFs, RO PUF is a special one, that employs relatively fewer delay components. A
rich body of work has been published to improve the reliability of RO PUFs, such as
selecting RO pairs to maximize the frequency gap [102]. In [84], an aging-resistant RO
PUF is proposed to make RO PUFs reliable against aging. While for other PUFs of
higher complexity like Arbiter PUFs, few work has been explored except some generic
methods [126] [64], such as using error correction codes (ECC) to correct the flipped
responses. However, there is more work needed to complete this picture:
• Few existing works take the device aging problem into consideration. Techniques
that work well for overcoming transient unreliability may be ineffective for dealing
with aging related flips;
• No specialized attention has been paid to improve the reliability of the popular
Arbiter PUFs using properties that are specific to the Arbiter PUF circuit structure,
instead of using general purpose error correction.
In this we explore the difference between reliable and unreliable PUF CRPs, and
the impact of environmental noise and device aging on them. We propose to use the
modeling technique that is capable of predicting both types of PUF unreliability. We
use the Arbiter PUF as an example to explore the reliability of delay based PUFs. As
a well-known member of delay based PUF family, Arbiter PUF has been employed as
the basic block to build many complicated PUF architectures, like the Feed-forward
Arbiter PUF [55], Lightweight PUF [70], and XOR PUF [102]. Therefore, techniques

15

that apply to the Arbiter PUF can be applied directly to other members of the
delay-based PUF family.
As described in previous sections, the noise sensitivity challenges PUFs reliability.
This impact can not be absolutely avoided since PUFs are based on microscopic
physical variability, which is easily disturbed by noise. Inspired by the truth that
physical variability was a barrier for conventional CMOS design but a chance for
hardware security study, constructively utilizing the noise sensitivity feature is a
promising direction, especially considering that PUFs own security characteristics.
Machine Learning modeling attacks have been deemed as the main threat to strong
PUFs. One possible solution to enhance the security of strong PUFs is leveraging
a more complex internal response-generating mechanism, which was supposed to
make ML attacks harder. For this reason, alternative silicon architectures have been
proposed in recent years. One such alternative is the ”Bistable Ring PUF” (BR PUF)
and its derivative ”Twisted Bistable Ring PUF” (TBR PUF) [14][15]. While it is still
a open problem that whether the proposed BR PUF and TBR PUF is as secure as
expected.

1.4

Thesis Contribution

The contribution of this thesis includes:
• Proposing a ranking technique to build reliable PUFs using data retention voltage
of SRAM cells, firstly applying Artificial Neural Network (ANN) technique for
simulation-free prediction of DRV as a function of temperature, process variation
assignments, and transistor sizes [119];
• Developing an analytical models for the BR PUF and the TBR PUF and use
these new models in order to apply, for the first time, support vector machines
(SVMs) to the BR PUF and the TBR PUF [120];
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• Constructively utilizing ML modeling method to improve the reliability of
delay-based PUFs, by predicting the noise-sensitive CRPs [116];
• Proposing a on-chip majority voting technique for reliable weak PUF design, in
which a sequential majority voting is realized using a self-timed circuit without
orchestration by a global clock. [118];
• Propose a failure-based PUF that uses failures induced by controlling the duration
of power gating. We demonstrate the approach in simulation using D flip-flop
circuits, and show that it reliably produces high quality output bits [117].

1.5

Thesis Outline

Following the introduction in this chapter, we divide the contribution of this thesis
into three parts:
• Chapter 2 presents a constructive usage of physical variability: reliable PUF
design on SRAM circuits. We demonstrates that SRAM DRV can serve as a
basis for reliable identification and key generation. We also propose the first
work that applies machine learning for simulation-free prediction of DRV as a
function of temperature, process variation assignments, and transistor sizes.
• Chapter 3 demonstrates a high quality PUF can be created by exploiting
differences in the failure propensity of instances of identical storage cells, and
this approach does not require power-up states to be unbiased.
• Chapter 4 re-examines security of the BR PUF and TBR PUF closely based
on FPGA implementations. We propose an analytical model for BR PUF and
TBR PUF, and for the first time, support vector machines (SVMs) is employed
to model these two PUF architectures.
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• Chapter 5 analyzes the unreliability causes of a PUF from two aspects: transient
noise and aging; the reliability impact of both aspects are explored respectively.
We employ ML modeling method for PUF characterization and utilize the model
to filter out the unreliable CRPs for each PUF, to achieve higher reliability.
• Chapter 6 explores hardware reliability techniques for PUF design. A novel
clockless sequential PUF structure that performs autonomous majority voting
is proposed, in which the external interface is included. Moreover, an internal
structure that autonomously performs majority voting to improve reliability is
realized.
• Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
RELIABLE PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS
USING DATA RETENTION VOLTAGE OF SRAM CELLS

The PUF studied in this chapter utilizes the variation sensitivity of SRAM Data
Retention Voltage (DRV), the minimum voltage at which each cell can retain state.
Prior work shows that DRV can uniquely identify circuit instances with 28% greater
success than SRAM power-up states that are used in PUFs [39]. However, DRV is
highly sensitive to temperature, and until now this makes it unreliable and unsuitable
for use in a PUF. In this chapter, we enable DRV PUFs by proposing a DRV-based
hash function that is insensitive to temperature. The new hash function, denoted
DRV-based Hashing (DH), is reliable across temperatures because it utilizes the
temperature-insensitive ordering of DRVs across cells, instead of using the DRVs
in absolute terms. To evaluate the security and performance of the DRV PUF,
we use DRV measurements from commercially-available SRAM chips, and use data
from a novel DRV prediction algorithm. The prediction algorithm uses machine
learning (ML) for fast and accurate simulation-free estimation of any cell’s DRV, and
the prediction error in comparison to circuit simulation has a standard deviation of
0.35 mV. We demonstrate the DRV PUF using two applications – secret key generation
and identification. In secret key generation, we introduce a new circuit-level reliability
knob as an alternative to error correcting codes. In the identification application, our
approach is compared to prior work and shown to result in a smaller false-positive
identification rate for any desired true-positive identification rate.
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2.1

Introduction

This chapter presents our work that employs Data Retention Voltage (DRV), the
minimum supply voltage at which state is retained, as the basis for a new SRAM
PUF. Previous work [39] has shown DRV fingerprints to be more informative than
power-up SRAM PUFs [31, 37]. The physical characteristics responsible for DRV
are imparted randomly to each cell during manufacturing, providing DRV with a
natural resistance to cloning. DRVs are not only random across chips, but also have
relatively little spatial correlation within a single chip and can be treated in analysis
as independent [52]. The proposed technique has the potential for wide application, as
SRAM cells are among the most common building blocks of nearly all digital systems.
In this chapter we extend the idea of DRV fingerprinting to create a PUF based
on DRV. To overcome the temperature-sensitivity of DRV, we propose a DRV-based
hashing scheme that is robust against temperature changes. The robustness of this
hashing comes from its use of (reliable) DRV-ordering instead of (less reliable) DRV
values. The use of DRV-ordering can be viewed as a differential mechanism at the
logical level instead of the circuit level as in most PUFs. To help validate the DRV
PUF, we propose a machine learning (ML) technique for simulation-free prediction
of DRVs as a function of process variations and temperature. The machine learning
model enables the rapid creation of the large DRV data sets required for evaluating
the DRV PUF approach. Our approach is furthermore supported using hardware
measurement of DRV data.
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We demonstrate that SRAM DRV can serve as a basis for reliable identification and
key generation. This finding is supported by DRV characterizations of 20k SRAM
cells measured three times at each of three different temperatures.
• We present the first work that applies machine learning for simulation-free prediction
of DRV as a function of temperature, process variation assignments, and transistor
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Figure 2.1: A six transistor SRAM cell. Q and Q̄ are the complementary state nodes
that store a single bit value between cross-coupled inverters implemented by transistors
M 1, M 2, M 3 and M 4. W L is the wordline, and controls access transistors M 5 and
M 6. BL and BL are the complementary bitlines used to read and write the SRAM
cell. Arrows denote the direction of current leakage.

sizes. Once the machine learning model is trained, it can predict the DRV of a cell
at a given temperature 2.2e6 times faster than circuit simulation, and its prediction
error versus circuit simulation has a standard deviation of only 0.35 mV.

2.2

Data Retention Voltage of SRAM

An SRAM cell is commonly implemented in CMOS technology as a six-transistor
circuit (Fig. 3.2). When an SRAM cell is in the standby condition, its word line (W L)
is set low, and the two access transistors (M 5 and M 6) are shut off. If the supply
voltage is sufficient, two inverters (composed of M 1, M 2 and M 3, M 4) use positive
feedback to pull one complementary state node (Q or Q̄) high, and the other low. If
supply voltage is below DRV, then transistors operate in the sub-threshold (sub-Vth )
region [81] where they are highly sensitive to variations and may lose state. Such a
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loss of state on account of insufficient supply voltage is termed a data retention failure.
The voltage at which data retention failures occur in each SRAM cell depends on its
asymmetric process variation. Because DRV is randomly assigned to each cell through
process variation, the DRV fingerprint of SRAM is a physical fingerprint suitable for
use in a PUF.
Since the DRV of SRAM signifies the minimum supply voltage at which cells can
store arbitrary state, DRV is usually studied as a lower limit to supply voltage scaling.
Most previous literature focuses on cases where the SRAM supply voltage remains
safely above DRV. While remaining above DRV, the supply voltage can be adjusted
to reduce leakage power [25, 12], compensate for manufacturing variability [75], or
compensate for environmental variations [113]. Our work is not concerned with
remaining above DRV, but instead with characterizing the DRV of each cell and using
this unique variation-sensitive information as part of a PUF.
Fast and accurate DRV analysis is needed to evaluate DRV fingerprinting, and
significant research effort has been spent on solving this problem. The default technique
for DRV analysis is Monte Carlo circuit simulation. When searching for the DRV
of an entire array instead of individual cells, improvements over basic Monte Carlo
simulation include the use of importance sampling [22], adaptive sampling [23, 44],
and boundary line searching [30]. An overview of several statistical techniques is given
by Wang et al. [114]. In Sec. 2.4 of this chapter, we propose a new technique that
uses machine learning to predict DRV. This approach differs from the aforementioned
statistical approaches in having the goal of predicting the DRV of individual cells,
instead of just accurately estimating the failure rate of the entire SRAM using process
variation statistics.
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Procedure 1 Characterize the DRV fingerprint of a set of SRAM cells.
Input: A set of bit-addressable SRAM cells
Output: vi0 , vi1 {the DRV characterization of cell at address i.}
1: Let Vnom be the nominal supply voltage for the SRAM
2: Let si refer to the logical state of SRAM address i.
3: for w = 0, 1 do
4:
for i ∈ SRAM do
5:
si ← w {write w to SRAM address}
6:
viw ← vmin {value used if no retention failure observed}
7:
end for
8:
vtest ← vmax {initialize test voltage}
9:
while vtest > vmin do
10:
lower SRAM voltage from Vnom to vtest
11:
remain at voltage vtest for time ttest
12:
raise SRAM voltage from vtest to Vnom
13:
for i ∈ SRAM do
14:
if (si 6= w) ∧ (viw = vmin ) then
15:
SRAM cell at address i did not retain state w after applying vtest , and vtest is
the first and highest voltage at which this retention failure occurred.
16:
viw ← vtest
17:
end if
18:
end for
19:
vtest ← vtest − ∆v {try a lower voltage next}
20:
end while
21: end for

2.3

DRV Characterization

We characterize the DRV of an SRAM cell at address i with a pair hvi0 , vi1 i. Each
viw represents the highest voltage at which address i will have a retention failure
after state w is written to it. In principle, vi0 and vi1 are real-valued; in practice,
we approximate each one using N discrete voltages with a step size of ∆v. Proc. 1
presents our characterization procedure. The implementation details of Proc. 1 vary
slightly when applied in hardware measurement or simulation as explained in the next
two subsections.
The DRV characterization procedure is parameterized by maximum, minimum,
and step size for test voltages (vmax , vmin , and ∆v respectively), and by the time (ttest )
for which each test voltage is applied. Simulations by Nourivand et al. [75] using a
procedure similar to Proc. 1 show that a value of 2 ms for ttest is sufficient to induce
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retention failures. The total time to characterize the DRV of an SRAM cell using
Proc. 1 is given by tproc in Eq. 2.1. In the case of simulation, tproc is the simulated
time, and the actual runtime for the circuit simulator is many orders of magnitude
larger. The frequency of observing different DRVs in hardware measurements and
simulation are shown in Fig 4.5.

tproc = ttest ×
2.3.1

vmax − vmin
∆v

(2.1)

Hardware DRV Measurement

The target platform for DRV fingerprinting is an integrated SRAM block with
an adjustable supply voltage, as is sometimes used to compensate for variation [54].
To simplify experiments, our platform mimics this configuration using a dedicated
SRAM chip and a separate microcontroller. Figure 2.2 presents the overview of our
experimental system. SRAM supply voltages are generated using analog outputs of a
Texas Instruments MSP430 F2618 microcontroller [108], and that same microcontroller
also orchestrates the timing of the supply voltage changes (per Proc. 1). An opamp configured as a voltage follower tracks the analog output voltage from the
microcontroller and powers the SRAM at the same voltage; the op-amp is used because
the analog output of the microcontroller cannot supply enough current to power the
SRAM directly. All experiments use instances of SRAM chip AS6C6264 [3] and the
DRV characterization parameters are vmax = 700 mV, vmin = 0 mV, ∆v = 2 mV,
and ttest = 1 s. Thermal tests are conducted inside of a Sun Electronics EC12
Environmental Chamber [105], and an OSXL450 infrared non-contact thermometer [76]
with ±2◦ C accuracy is used to verify the temperature.
Note that our experimental platform differs from that used in our previous work
[39]. In our previous work, the DRVs of SRAM cells in a microcontroller memory
are characterized by repeatedly lowering the microcontroller’s supply voltage and
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Figure 2.2: Experimental platform used for determining SRAM chip DRV assignments.
Photographed in EECS department, at the University of Michigan.

observing the highest voltage that induces a retention failure in each cell. Because the
microcontroller’s SRAM shares a common supply node with the processing core, the
low test voltages used for the characterization cause the core to reset and lose its state.
As persistent state is required for the DRV characterization, our experiments used the
microcontroller’s non-volatile memory to preserve state while the test voltages were
applied.

2.3.2

DRV Measurement in SPICE Simulation

Circuit simulation is a second platform for DRV characterization (Proc. 1), and
it complements hardware measurements by allowing for DRV exploration under
controllable process variations and environmental conditions. In circuit simulation,
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Figure 2.3: Distance (per Eq. 2.3) between two characterizations of the same cell
increases as temperature changes.

we use transistor models from the 45 nm predictive technology model [127, 13]. To
mimic the random process variations that give each cell its unique DRV, variations
are introduced for transistor width W , length L and threshold voltage Vth . The
International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) indicates that transistor
length should have a 3σ variation that is 10% of the nominal length L [1, 5]. Adopting
the same guideline for transistor width, in our simulation the random components of
both W and L are normally distributed with a standard deviation that is 3.33% of the
nominal W or L value. The standard deviation of threshold voltage is given by Eq. 2.2;
a value of 1.8 mV*µm is used for the matching constant AVth [79]. The parameter
values used when implementing the DRV characterization procedure (Proc. 1) in
SPICE are vmax = 500 mV, vmin = 0 mV, 4v = 0.1 mV, and ttest = 2 ms.

σVth = √

AVth
W ∗L
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(2.2)
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Figure 2.4: The joint probability distribution function over all cells of the two variables
(vi0 and vi1 ) comprising a DRV characterization. The distribution is determined
experimentally using Proc. 1, and shows that a large fraction of cells have the
minimum possible value (vmin ) for either v 0 or v 1 , indicating a cell that retains one
written state across all test voltages.

27

2.3.3

Impact of Temperature Variations

DRVs generally increase with temperature [81], and this hinders the reliability of
DRV-based fingerprinting. Recalling that each DRV is a point hvi0 , vi1 i in 2-dimensional
space, an intuitive way to define the distance between two DRVs is to use their distance
in this 2-dimensional space (Eq. 2.3). This distance metric is used as the basis for
DRV fingerprint matching in our previous work [39]. To demonstrate the impact of
temperature, we compute the average distance between two characterizations of the
same cell, when one is taken at 28◦ C and the other at 50◦ C, or 70◦ C. As shown in
Fig. 2.3, the average distance between the two characterizations increases with the
temperature difference.

d1(i, j) =

q

vi0 − vj0

2

+ vi1 − vj1

2

(2.3)

Given that DRV fingerprints are intended for use in real-world scenarios without precisely-controlled temperatures, the temperature sensitivity shown in Fig. 2.3
indicates that the distance metric of Eq. 2.3 is prone to unreliability in real-world
usage. In Sec. 2.5, we propose a new technique for extracting temperature-invariant
information from DRV and demonstrate that this new technique is highly reliable
when temperature fluctuates.

2.4

Modeling the DRV of an SRAM Cell

Although the SPICE simulation described in Sec. 2.3.2 is a straightforward and
highly accurate approach to characterize the DRV of SRAM cells, it is very time
consuming for two reasons. The first reason is that, to find the maximum voltage that
induces a failure in each cell, numerous test voltages must be applied (Proc. 1). The
second reason is simply that simulating each test voltage is itself very slow. On our
experimental machine, equipped with an Intel Xeon E5-2690 processor running at
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2.90 GHz with 64 GB of RAM, simulating a single test voltage on a single SRAM cell
for 2 ms has a runtime of 0.17 s.
An alternative to iterative SPICE analysis is to predict DRV using a model. Just
as the DRV of each SRAM cell is ultimately determined by temperature and the
process variations of its transistors, the DRV of an SRAM cell can be formulated as a
function of its temperature T and transistor width, length, and threshold voltage (W ,
L, and Vth respectively). Qin et al. [81] provide an analytical model for the DRV of
an individual cell as in Eq. 2.4, where DRVr is the DRV at room temperature, and
DRVf is defined in Eq. 2.5 with 4T representing the temperature difference from
room temperature. Terms ai , bi , and c in Eq. 2.5 are fitting coefficients and their
values are determined empirically for each CMOS technology process [81].

DRV = DRVr + DRVf

DRVf =

6
X
i=1

(2.4)

6

4(Wi /Li ) X
+
bi ∗ 4(Vthi ) + c ∗ 4T
ai ∗
Wi /Li
i=1

(2.5)

Although this model can accurately estimate the DRV of a cell, it has two weaknesses that create the need for a more advanced model:
1. To predict a specified DRV value with Eq. 2.5, the user needs to know the
DRVr for each SRAM cell. This value is not expressed as a function of transistor
parameters and can only be calculated through hardware measurement or
computationally expensive circuit simulation.
2. Using the same coefficients ai , bi and c for different SRAM cells creates estimation
errors. In reality, the DRV of different cells increase according to different
coefficients depending on their unique process variations. This distinction is
especially important in our work, where the unique impact of process variations
across cells is critical to the overall work.
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2.4.1

Predicting DRV using Artificial Neural Networks

Our approach addresses the two aforementioned weaknesses in Qin’s work by using
machine learning for DRV prediction. The machine learning algorithm predicts the
DRV directly from the parameters that are responsible for determining it, without using
expensive circuit simulation. Given that the values of process variation parameters
vary over bounded ranges, it follows that the DRVs too fall within a bounded range
[DRVmin , DRVmax ]. The range of DRVs is manually divided into K classes, each
with size 4DRV (Eq. 2.6). The use of K classes makes DRV prediction a “multiclassification” problem: for any given feature pattern {Wi , Li , ...Vth i , T }, there is
exactly one among K classes corresponding to the correct DRV output.
[DRVmin , DRVmax ] = {[DRVmin , DRVmin + 4DRV )∪
[DRVmin + 4DRV, DRVmin + 2 ∗ 4DRV ) ∪ ...

(2.6)

... ∪ [DRVmax − 4DRV, DRVmax ]}

Artificial Neural Network(ANN) is a well-known ML method [40] that is widely
used to solve multi-classification problems. Our DRV prediction method specifies the
DRV of an SRAM cell as an ANN output class, and indicates the class to which the
corresponding SRAM parameter pattern should be assigned to. Our approach collects
a group of samples from SPICE, including physical parameters of SRAM circuitry as
input and corresponding DRV values (which can be viewed as golden value) as output.
An ANN model is later trained based on this data to match input with output. In
this process, neurons learn to classify the examples from each class (Fig 2.5). Finally,
the hidden neurons dealing with the same class will be combined as one group, so
the number of groups corresponds to the number of output classes. Each class has a
corresponding surface, which is approximated by the combined neuron groups.
To get data for ANN model training, we use SPICE simulator as the infrastructure
for collecting DRV statistics. DRV values are extracted from simulations of 2000
cells across temperature 25℃ to 100℃, with a step size of 1℃. A common problem
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Figure 2.5: Artificial neural network for DRV classification and prediction.

with ML models is overfitting, where a model is trained to perform well on training
data but fails to yield similar results upon seeing new data. To avoid overfitting
in building the DRV model, we reordered the samples and divided them into three
subsets: training (60%) validation (20%) and test (20%). Training set is the data set
used for computing the gradient and updating the network weights and biases. The
validation set is used to monitor errors during the training process. The validation set
and training set error usually decreases during the initial phase of training. The test
set error is not used during training, but is used to validate the model performance
and compare different models.

2.4.2

Evaluating Accuracy of DRV Prediction

The prediction results of the test subsets are shown as Fig. 2.6. The regression
plots display the ANN-predicted DRVs with respect to the golden DRV values collected
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Figure 2.6: Training results based on Neural Network model, across three data sets.
R denotes the correlation between golden DRV data from SPICE simulation, and
predicted DRV value from our model.

from SPICE simulation. In Fig. 2.6, R denotes the correlation between model outputs
and golden values. For a perfect fit, the predicted outputs should be equal to the
golden values (the data should fall along a 45 degree line). For our DRV model, there
is a high correlation between prediction and output for all data sets.
Before our ANN model in this work, the linear model described in Eq. 2.5 was
widely used to model the DRV value of SRAM designs, which can be optimized
with Linear Regression (LR) method. LR fits a data model that is linear in the
model coefficients. The most common type of LR is a “least-squares fit”, which
can find an optimal line to represent the discrete data points. In a LR model, the
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same physical parameters of ANN models are defined as input training features
p = {pi , |pi ∈ {W1 /L1 , W2 /L2 , . . . , T }}. By denoting the linear coefficients with
θ = {θ0 , θ1 , . . . , θn }, we get:

hθ (p) = θ0 + θ1 ∗ p1 + · · · + θn ∗ pn

(2.7)

where θ stands for the set of coefficients (e.g. ai and bi as shown in Eq. 2.5). Each
training sample is composed of transistor feature set p and the corresponding golden
DRV value DRVgolden from SPICE simulation. Based on “least-squares fit” rule, the
cost function of m training examples can be expressed as:
m

J(θ) =

1 X
(k)
(hθ (p(k) ) − DRVgolden )2
2m k=1

(2.8)

where p(k) corresponds to the training features of k th training sample, like the transistor
sizes and temperature. To obtain the optimal θ, we applied “Gradient Descent”
simultaneously on each coefficient θj , j ∈ (1, 2 . . . n):
Repeat{
θj : = θj − α
= θj − α

∂J(θ)
∂θj
m
1 X
m

(2.9)
(k)

(hθ (p ) −

(k)
(k)
DRVgolden )pi

i=1

}
(k)

α is the learning rate of linear regression model, pi

is the ith feature of the k th

training sample.
To further evaluate the effectiveness of our ANN model, we compare its prediction
error to that of the LR model1 on a randomly chosen data set of size 3500. Fig. 2.7
1

The linear regression model is trained and optimized with the same three data sets as the neural
network model.
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Figure 2.7: DRV prediction error for the artificial neural network model and linear
regression model. In both cases, error is determined by comparison to SPICE simulated
results.

presents the prediction error of these models. The neural network model achieves
smaller prediction errors than the linear regression model. The mean µ and standard
deviation σ of prediction error for the neural network model are −0.01 mV and
0.35 mV respectively, while those of the linear regression model are 0.041 mV and
0.9 mV. The neural network model outperforms the linear model because the neural
network model assigns varied weights and bias to different feature patterns 2 , whereas
the linear model formulates all input features with the same optimized θ.
2

This also validates our finding in Fig. 2.8, that different SRAM cells have different DRV growth
slopes while temperature is increasing.
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Figure 2.8: DRV of SRAM cells increase linearly with temperature, but the slope
varies across cells. The ordering of DRV is largely preserved across temperatures,
except for a few cells that switch ordering.

2.5

DRV-based PUF

DRV-based identification or authentication schemes must consider the impact of
temperature changes. The DRV of each SRAM cell increases approximately linearly
with temperature [81], and the coefficient relating DRV to temperature varies only
slightly across cells. Accordingly, the relative ordering of DRVs across cells is more
reliable than the values themselves; in other words, the cell with the ith highest DRV
will remain roughly the ith highest when temperature changes, even though all DRVs
will change in absolute terms. Fig. 2.8 shows the relationship of DRV and temperature,
according to machine learning prediction, for 10 randomly chosen SRAM cells. The
DRV ordering is preserved across temperature values, except for two pairs of cells
that flip their ordering. Any two cells with sufficiently different nominal DRVs have a
DRV-ordering that does not change with temperature.
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2.5.1

DRV-based Hashing with DH and DH-Preimage

To utilize the robustness of DRV ordering, we propose a hashing scheme with the
mapping between challenges and responses defined by the DRV-ordering within SRAM
address pairs. In this scheme, a challenge C of length m is a sequence of address pairs
(hc̄0 , c0 i, . . . , hc̄m−1 , cm−1 i), a response R is a bit string (r0 , . . . , rm−1 ). A DRV measurement D assigns values to each address of an SRAM such that D(c) = max(vc0 , vc1 ),
where vc0 and vc1 are the minimum retention voltages after writing the 0 and 1 states
to the cell at address c (Proc. 1). Note that a DRV D is a single imprecise observation, and two DRVs produced by the same chip will only match approximately.
Procedure DH(D, C) (Proc. 2) hashes a challenge C to a response R. Procedure
DH-Preimage(D, R) (Proc. 3) computes a challenge C that reliably hashes to response R on a particular chip. For any DRV assignment D and response R, the relationship R = DH(D, DH-Preimage(D, R)) holds. Procedures DH and DH-Preimage
are the building blocks for key generation and identification applications in Sec. 2.5.2
and 2.5.4.
The DRV-based hashing procedure DH is designed to be resilient to small fluctuations in DRV, and to common-mode DRV shifts such as those caused by temperature.
The steps for DH are given in Proc. 2. For each address pair hc̄i , ci i in the challenge,
the corresponding response bit ri is assigned a 1 if address ci has the higher or equal
DRV, and 0 if address c¯i has a higher DRV. Procedure DH is made resilient by
applying challenges for which the addresses in each pair have vastly different DRVs,
so that the inequality at line 2 of Proc. 2 consistently resolves in the same way despite
small variations.
Given a DRV D and a desired response R, the role of procedure DH-Preimage is
to create a challenge C that will reliably generate R whenever it is applied to the same
SRAM that produced D. The steps for DH-Preimage are shown in Proc. 3. For
each bit ri of the desired response, a pair of challenge addresses hc̄i , ci i is chosen. If
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the desired response bit is 0 (1), then c̄i (ci ) is assigned the address of the cell with the
higher DRV. Note that the two addresses chosen for each pair have markedly dissimilar
DRVs that are separated by |D| − m positions in DRV ordering (see lines 3 and 5 of
Proc. 3), where |D| is the SRAM size and m is the response length. Stated differently,
one address in each pair has one of the m highest DRVs in the SRAM, and the other
has one of the m lowest DRVs. The DRV dissimilarity within each address pair ensures
that the higher DRV can be reliably determined when the challenge is applied in a
subsequent call to DH.
A demonstration of the DRV-based hashing is given in Fig. 2.9. According to the
depicted DRV assignment D, procedure DH hashes challenge C = (h1, 10i, h6, 9i, h7, 5i)
to response R = (1, 0, 1): the first response bit is 1 because address 10 has a higher
DRV than address 1, the second response bit is 0 because address 6 has a higher DRV
than address 9, and the third response bit is 1 because address 5 has a higher DRV
than address 7.
A necessary condition for obtaining a wrong response bit for a challenge address
pair is that, when some test voltage is applied, the cell with nominally lower DRV
fails, and the cell with the nominally higher DRV does not. In the toy example of
Fig. 2.9, given that the DRVs within each pair have a gap of 110 mV, this will only
happen in the case of extreme noise or if the supply voltage differs by 110 mV from
one cell location to the other. As the cells of an SRAM are powered by the same
supply, and given that supply nodes are already designed to avoid local voltage droop,
such a large supply voltage difference across cells is uncommon.
The DRV hashing scheme in this chapter is related to index-based syndrome (IBS)
coding [126] and ordering-based encoding schemes applied to PUFs with real-valued
outputs [69]. Given a group of indexed objects with real-valued measurements, IBS
coding encodes each bit to a syndrome that is the index of the maximum or minimum
value in the group depending on the bit’s polarity. Given noisy measurements of
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Figure 2.9: Example of DRV-hashing. According to the depicted DRV assignment
D, and letting challenge C be (h1, 10i, h6, 9i, h7, 5i), procedure DH(D, C) produces
response R = (1, 0, 1). Similarly, procedure DH-Preimage(D, R), given this response
R, would produce as output the same challenge C.

the same indexed objects, the syndrome is decoded by determining whether the
measurement it indexes is closer to maximal or minimal in the group. A comparison of
the reliability and security of IBS versus other approaches is given by Yu et al. [125].
Variants of IBS coding are also applied to SRAM power-up state PUFs [35]. Procedures
DH-Preimage and DH are analogs for IBS encoding and decoding respectively. In
addition to using a hashing scheme related to IBS coding, a second reliability enhancing
feature is that the SRAM cell pairs are selected to maximize the discrepancy between
the values in each pairing. The idea of configuring real-valued PUFs to utilize large
discrepancies for enhanced reliability has been proposed previously for ring oscillator
PUFs [102, 124], where the identifying feature is oscillator frequency instead of
minimum retention voltage.
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Procedure 2 R = DH(D, C): Use DRV assignment D to hash challenge C to
response R.
Input: D {DRV assignments for a set of SRAM addresses}
Input: C {sequence of addr pairs (hc̄0 , c0 i, . . . , hc̄m−1 , cm−1 i)}
Output: R {bit string response (r0 , . . . , rm−1 ) to challenge}
1: for hc̄i , ci i ∈ C do
2:
ri ← (D(ci ) ≥ D(c̄i ))
3: end for
4: return R

Procedure 3 C = DH-Preimage(D, R): Map response R to challenge C using
DRV assignment D.
Input: D {SRAM DRVs. D(a) is DRV of cell at address a.}
Input: R {the desired response bit string (r0 , . . . , rm−1 )}
Output: C {sequence of addr pairs (hc̄0 , c0 i, . . . , hc̄m−1 , cm−1 i)} {sort addresses by DRV.
Let ai denote address such that D(ai ) is ith highest among all addresses}
1: for i ∈ 0..(|R| − 1) do
2:
if ri = 1 then
3:
hc̄i , ci i ← hai+|D|−m , ai i {ci gets addr with higher DRV}
4:
else
5:
hc̄i , ci i ← hai , ai+|D|−m i {c̄i gets addr with higher DRV}
6:
end if
7: end for
8: return C

2.5.2

Secret Key Generation

Cryptographic keys must be fully reliable, and this is in conflict with the inherent
imprecision of PUFs in sensing the effects of small physical variations. Error correcting
codes can bridge the gap from noisy PUFs to reliable keys. With error correction, some
number of raw response bits are transformed by helper data into a noisy codeword that
is decoded into a reliable key. One example of error correction in weak PUFs is the use
of BCH codes with power-up fingerprints [31]. The physical nature of PUFs also allows
for circuit-level reliability mechanisms that enable lighter-weight3 error correcting
codes, or in some cases supplant them entirely. Examples of reliability-enhancing
circuit techniques are reinforcing variation tendencies with directed aging [74, 10], and

3

i.e. codes that are cheaper to implement but cannot correct as many errors.
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using helper data to mark on each device the response bits that are precharacterized
as unreliable [126].
Our key generation using DRV-hashing uses circuit-level reliability enhancement
and (optionally) error correcting codes. The steps to implement DRV-based secret key
generation for a given SRAM instance are shown in Proc. 4. Lines 1-5 comprise the
enrollment process to occur at the manufacturer immediately after fabrication. First,
an arbitrary secret key K is chosen and encoded into codeword R; R is the value that
should be the response of the DRV PUF in the field later. Next, DH-Preimage is
called (line 3) to generate a challenge that will reliably hash to response R on this PUF
instance. The challenge is then stored to a one-time-programmable on-chip memory
(line 4). Finally, the enrollment process is completed by blowing a fuse to disable the
DH-Preimage functionality (line 5). After the enrollment process is completed, the
PUF can be used in the field as a secret key. When the stored challenge C is applied
to the PUF in the field, it hashes to response R0 according to DRV D0 (line 6). If
D0 is similar to the enrollment DRV D (as it will be for the same chip), then the
inherent robustness of DH should produce a response R0 that exactly matches or
closely approximates R. Response R0 , a possibly noisy version of the original codeword
R, is decoded to correct errors and regenerate the enrolled key K (line 7). This key is
a secret, chosen by the party that enrolled the DRV PUF, and known only to them.
To maintain secrecy of key K, it must only be used as an input to a cryptographic
hash, and never be revealed in plain text.
Note the secrecy of the generated key requires that an attacker cannot apply
arbitrary challenges to the DRV PUF. If an attacker can apply chosen challenges,
then helper data manipulation attacks from other pairing-based PUFs [17] can also
expose the secret key from the DRV PUF. It is therefore necessary in the secret
key application that the challenge addresses are supplied exclusively from a memory
that is not overwritable in the field. Note that non-overwritable challenge addresses
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need not be secret. The addresses do not leak information about the key under the
assumption that DRVs are independent and identically distributed, as shown in work
on index-based syndrome coding [125].
An adversary possessing a chip may somehow modify the test voltages prescribed
by Proc. 1 for DRV characterization. This could induce a flawed DRV characterization;
for example, if the voltage is never lowered at all, the characterization would wrongly
conclude that all cells have a DRV of 0 V since none ever had a retention failure at any
test voltage. However, voltage manipulation does not provide any useful information
about the DRV-based secret key. Even though it may be possible to learn that a
retention failure happens at some particular voltage, no information is leaked unless it
can be determined which address in a pair failed, and this is not observable because
the output of the DRV PUF is never revealed in the clear.

2.5.3

Reliability

The response bit-error-rate (BER) in key generation experiments depends on the
key size and the size of the SRAM used for the DRV PUF. The result of Fig. 2.10
shows the BER4 of an m-bit key generated by a 2m-cell SRAM5 . The response BER
decreases as m increases, and does not exceed 1e-5 for any key size larger than 60
bits. The BER decreases as the SRAM size increases, because a larger SRAM tends
to have a larger difference between the DRVs of the addresses within each challenge
pair. We refer to the DRV difference between the two addresses in each challenge pair
as the “DRV gap” of a DRV PUF. Larger DRV gaps indicate more reliable DRV PUF
4

In BER analysis, error correcting codes are not used so that circuit-level reliability of the
proposed hashing scheme can be observed. Error correcting codes would serve to correct the errors
that contribute to BER.
5
An SRAM with 2m cells is the smallest SRAM capable of generating an m-bit response, because
each response bit is generated using two addresses.
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Figure 2.10: When implementing a key of length m using a DRV PUF in SRAM of
size 2m (per Proc. 4), the response bit error rate (BER) decreases as m increases.
The decrease in BER results from an increase in the DRV gap, where “avg DRV gap”
represents the absolute DRV difference between c̄i and ci , averaged over challenge
pairs.

responses, because the determination in DH of which challenge address has the higher
DRV will be less error prone.
The BER can be further reduced by increasing the size of the SRAM to beyond the
minimum of twice the key length m. In this case, the cells with DRVs near the median
DRV of the SRAM are not among the m highest nor m lowest, and are therefore not
selected by DH-Preimage to be used in the challenge. This further increases the
DRV gap to reduce BER. Fig. 2.10 shows experimentally the average DRV gap as
a function of SRAM size and key length. The areas of Figure 2.10 with the darkest
coloring correspond to the most reliable scenarios for key generation. Therefore,
arbitrary robustness can be added directly to the hashing scheme, creating a second
reliability knob to be used in concert with, or instead of, error correcting codes.
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Figure 2.11: Results showing identification performance using the distance
metric Response-Distance (Proc. 5) in upper plots, and performance using Voltage-Distance (Eq. 2.10) in the lower plots. The temperature resilience of DH and DH-Preimage causes Response-Distance to outperform
Voltage-Distance, as indicated by lower false positive rates for equivalent true
positive rates.
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Figure 2.12: When implementing a key of length m using a DRV PUF in SRAM of
size ≥ 2m (per Proc. 4), there is a clear increase in the average DRV gap as SRAM
size increases. Because a larger DRV gap equates to a lower BER, changing the size
of SRAM therefore represents a reliability knob for the DRV PUF.

2.5.4

Circuit Identification

Hashing functions DH and DH-Preimage can be used for reliable chip identification, in a way that is similar to their use in key generation. In this application,
the DRV of each SRAM is not considered secret, and arbitrary challenges can be
applied to the SRAM. The goal of chip identification is to determine whether two
DRV characterizations D1 and D2 are generated by the same SRAM cells. Using
a distance metric to quantify dissimilarity between two DRV characterizations, a
determination of “same identity” is made whenever the distance between D1 and
D2 is below some matching threshold. Distances between two DRVs from the same
cells are denoted within-class, and distances between two DRVs from different cells
are denoted between-class. A true positive identification occurs when a within-class
distance is below the matching threshold, and a false positive identification occurs
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Procedure 4 Use DRV PUF as reliable secret key. Lines 1-4 enroll the PUF and
personalize it with key K. Lines 5-6 occur in the field to regenerate K from challenge
C.
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

Choose a secret key K
R = Ecc-Encode(K) {for error correction}
C ← DH-Preimage(D, R) {challenge C is public}
Store C to one-time-programmable on-chip memory
Disable DH-Preimage {Blow fuse. See Fig. 2.9}

6: R0 ← DH(D 0 , C) {D 0 ≈ D =⇒ R0 ≈ R}
7: K ← Ecc-Decode(R0 ) {Regenerated secret key inside chip}

when a between-class distance is below the matching threshold. Perfect identification
is possible when all within-class distances are smaller than all between-class distances,
as it is then possible to choose a matching threshold that will produce a true positive
identification for all within-class distances without any false positives.
The distance between DRVs D1 and D2 is computed as Response-Distance(D1, D2)
(Proc. 5). The first step of Proc. 5 is to choose a random response R1 (line 1) and
generate for D1 a challenge C that is the preimage of R1 (line 2). Response R2 is
then obtained by hashing C using D2 (line 3). If D1 and D2 are from the same chip,
then the BER analysis of the previous subsection shows that R1 and R2 will also be
similar. To perform identification in a challenging (high-BER) scenario, we use a short
key of length 10 and a small SRAM with 20 cells (see Fig. 2.10). The distribution
of within-class and between-class distances are shown in Fig. 2.11a, and the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) plot of Fig. 2.11b shows the identification performance
for the data. Each ROC curve traces tradeoffs between true positive and false positive
identification that can be achieved by changing the matching threshold. The three
ROC curves in Fig. 2.11b compare identification of across-temperature within-class
distances against between-class distances at a single temperature; these three comparisons are chosen because they are the most challenging identification scenarios, as
indicated by the largest overlaps between the two distributions (Fig. 2.11a).
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We evaluate the performance of Response-Distance for circuit identification
(Proc. 5) by comparing its ROC curves (Fig. 2.11b) against the ROC curves obtained
for the same data by our prior identification scheme [39]. In our prior work, letting
the characterization of address i in D1 and D2 be denoted hv10i , v11i i and hv20i , v21i i,
the distance between D1 and D2 is given by Voltage-Distance(D1, D2) (Eq. 2.10).
The within-class and between-class distances according to Voltage-Distance have
a larger overlap (Fig. 2.11c), and the corresponding ROC curves (Fig. 2.11d) have
inferior performance because they admit in all cases a larger false positive identification
rate for the same true positive identification rate.

Voltage-Distance(D1, D2) =
Xq
2
2
(v10i − v20i ) + (v11i − v21i )

(2.10)

i

Procedure 5 Response-Distance(D1, D2): Compute distance between responses
of two SRAMs when the same challenge is applied to both.
Input: D1 {DRVs for chip 1. D1(a) is chip 1 DRV at address a.}
Input: D2 {DRVs for chip 2. D2(a) is chip 2 DRV at address a.}
Output: x {the distance between D1 and D2}
1: Choose randomly R1 ∈ {0, 1}|D1|/2
2: C ← DH-Preimage(D1, R1) {note: R1 = DH(D1, C)}
3: R2 ← DH(D2, C)
4: x ← Hamming-Distance(R1, R2)
5: return x

2.6

Summary

This chapter presents a collection of techniques that allow the data retention
voltage of SRAM cells to be used as the basis of a reliable PUF. We propose a machine
learning approach for fast and accurate simulation-free prediction of DRV values.
We present procedures DH and DH-Preimage for reliable hashing based on DRV
measurements, and demonstrate that the reliability of these approaches stems from
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their use of DRV-ordering instead of the absolute DRV values that were previously
proposed. We use a large data set of DRVs from circuit simulation to train and analyze
our DRV-prediction scheme, and use a large data set of DRV measurements from
SRAM chips to quantify the reliability of DH and DH-Preimage in key generation
and identification applications.
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CHAPTER 3
RELIABLE PUF DESIGN USING FAILURE PATTERNS
FROM TIME-CONTROLLED POWER GATING

A common PUF mechanism is based on uninitialized power-up states of bistable
storage elements, but any bias in these storage elements will reduce their sensitivity
to process variations and induce correlated outputs. Alternatively, a high quality
PUF can be created by exploiting differences in the failure propensity of instances
of identical storage cells, and this approach does not require power-up states to be
unbiased. Contrary to previous failure-based PUFs that induce failures by controlling
supply voltage explicitly, in this chapter we propose a failure-based PUF that uses
failures induced by controlling the duration of power gating. We demonstrate the
approach in simulation using D flip-flop circuits, and show that it reliably produces
high quality output bits.

3.1

Introduction

Storing static on-chip identifiers (IDs) with non-volatile memory is a conventional
method to identify integrated circuits. However, such identifiers are vulnerable to attacks and are trivial to clone. On the contrary, converting physical features of circuitry
into unique fingerprints has several advantages and many possible implementations. In
literature, circuits that translate physical features into unique IDs are called physical
unclonable functions (PUFs) [26, 77], or more specifically within PUF literature as
physically obfuscated keys [27] or weak PUFs [31]. Since PUFs are harder to clone,
they can lead to more secure chip IDs and keys. The outputs of PUFs are sensitive to
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various noise sources and this hinders their practical applicability. Much effort has
been spent on correcting the bit errors caused by environmental fluctuations, such as
using error correction codes [19], or adding helper circuitry for calibration or temporal
majority voting [73].
The power-up state of static random-access memory (SRAM) has been proposed
as the basis for PUFs in FPGAs [31] and micro-controllers [36]. However, modern
FPGAs initialize or reset the values of all SRAM blocks at time of power up, and this
renders SRAM PUFs unsuitable for FPGAs. For building PUFs in FPGAs, Maes
et al. [65] propose using the power up states of flip-flops instead of SRAM. Unlike
SRAM, flip-flop circuits have biased power up states and can only produce high quality
outputs through complicated post-processing methods [65].
Independent of any bias in power up state or other fingerprint, any system with a
number of identical storage cells will have some asymmetry in how failure-prone the
various cells are. Stated differently, if the cells are subjected to the same conditions,
some cells will be more likely to fail than others. This asymmetry can be used as the
basis of a fingerprint. Yet, memory cells are designed so that failures will not occur
in normal operation, and therefore some steps must be taken to induce the failures.
In previous works, failures have been induced by manipulating the supply voltage of
SRAM arrays [39, 119], or by lengthening the refresh interval of DRAM arrays [86]. In
this work, we propose manipulating the duration of power gating as a way of inducing
device-identifying failures and we demonstrate a PUF design based on this principle.
Power gating is an energy-saving technique for embedded systems [42] in which
the power supply is effectively turned off for inactive parts of the chip. Power gating
is common in modern embedded systems, including the Xilinx 7 series FPGAs [43],
and the ARM Cortex-M series processors [46]. An example schematic of power-gated
logic is depicted in Fig. 3.1; a PMOS transistor is inserted between the normal supply
voltage (VDD ) and a virtual supply voltage (VDD V ) that directly powers the logic.

49

A “high” sleep signal will cut the connection to the virtual power supply so that the
gated circuitry will not draw power from VDD . Utilizing power-gated DFFs, we make
the following contributions in this work:
• We utilize retention failure counts of storage cells to create a PUF that can be used
even when the storage cells are strongly biased in their power-up states;
• We propose a characterization algorithm to extract failure counts and reliably map
them to responses in an experimental dataset containing 10,000 DFF cells;
• We present the first technique that extracts identifying information from retention
failures of CMOS cells without requiring the ability to explicitly control supply
voltage.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 reviews related
work on PUFs. Section 3.3 introduces data retention failures, their measurement
based on power-gating and their sensitivity to temperature. Section 3.4 presents our
approach and evaluates it on DFFs. Section 3.5 presents directions for future work
and concludes this chapter.

3.2

Related Work

Chip identifiers based on features of pre-existing circuits are an economical solution,
and many techniques have been proposed for this purpose. Perhaps the most popular
such approach exploits the power-up states of SRAM cells as chip IDs [31, 37]. Maes
et al. [65] propose using the power-up state of DFFs as on-chip identifiers for FPGAs,
but the power-up states of DFFs have significant bias due to design asymmetry.
An alternative to using power-up state of memories is to extract identifiers from
retention failure signatures in various types of memories. Identifiers of this type can
be extracted from the minimum data retention voltages of SRAM cells [39]. Bacha
et al. [8] show that device-identifying retention failures can be observed through the
error correction logic of caches on existing processors. Xu et al. [119] propose a key
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Figure 3.1: Schematic of power gating using a header switch. A PMOS transistor is
employed between the supply node (VDD ) and the virtual supply node (VDD V ) that
directly powers the block. A sleep signal enables and disables the connection between
VDD and VDD V .

generation scheme based on SRAM retention voltages that can produce identifiers
which are reliable across temperature variations. Other researchers have proposed
DRAM PUFs [88] by using identifying properties of DRAM failures, and several
other works have shown that write failures [34] and retention failures in approximate
DRAMs under lengthened refresh intervals [85] also produce identifying signatures.
Borrowing ideas from failure-based PUFs, and time-controlled failures in DRAM, we
propose a time-controlled failure-based PUF for CMOS storage cells that be actuated
through power gating.
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Figure 3.2: Schematic of a positive-edge triggered master-slave D flip flop. Q and Q̄
are the complementary state nodes that store a single bit value between cross-coupled
NAND gates. The input value D is stored in the master latch when CLK rises. Nearly
simultaneously, the slave latch opens to allow the stored signal from the master to
propagate through the slave to the output.

3.3
3.3.1

Inducing Failures using Timing
Retention Failures at Low Supply Voltage

CMOS storage cells can fail to retain stored values if the supply voltage is too low.
In the case of SRAM cells, the minimum supply voltage at which data can be safely
stored is denoted the data retention voltage (DRV). SRAM must therefore remain
above DRV to function correctly. While remaining above DRV, the supply voltage
can be adjusted to reduce leakage power [25, 12], compensate for manufacturing
variability [75], or compensate for environmental variations [113].
Our work borrows the idea of DRV from SRAM literature and applies it data
retention of DFF cells. A positive-edge-triggered master-slave DFF cell can be
constructed from two D latches as depicted in Fig. 3.2. Like SRAM, DFF cells can
fail to retain data when voltage drops too low. Unlike SRAM cells, DFF cells have
biased power up states [65]. Fig. 3.3 shows the power-up of 30 DFF cells, and it
can be observed that all cells take the same power-up state of Q = 1. This bias
makes the power-up states of the cells unsuitable as fingerprints. In spite of having
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Figure 3.3: Power up simulation of 30 D flip-flop cells showing that all cells power-up
to the Q = 1 state. This consistent bias makes their power-up state unsuitable as a
fingerprint.

indistinguishable power-up states, these cells may experience retention failures at
different supply voltages.

3.3.2

Power Gating Duration as a Proxy for Supply Voltage

Finding the voltage at which each cell will fail, as is required for DRV-based
fingerprints [39], generally relies on voltage control and this causes the fingerprint
generation procedure to be very complicated. Prior work shows that the absolute
retention failure voltages are not necessary and that a reliable identifier can be
extracted from the relative ordering of the failures [119], but in this prior work the
ordering is still extracted by controlling the supply voltage.
Our proposed technique effectively derives ordering of retention failures across cells
without explicitly controlling the supply voltage. Instead of voltage control, powergating duration is the controlled variable that reveals the relative failure ordering
of cells. The minimum voltage applied to the cells, which is the direct cause of the
retention failures, is simply an effect of the power gating duration. Fig. 3.4 shows
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a header switch, or sleep transistor, added between the power supply node VDD and
a set of DFF cells. When the gate of the sleep transistor is 0 it will be turned on
and the DFFs will operate normally. If the sleep transistor is temporarily turned off
by a high gate voltage, node VDD V will decay and then be recharged once the sleep
transistor is turned on again. If VDD V falls sufficiently low during this time, then
some DFFs may lose their stored values. In the simulation, nodes D and CLK of
each DFF are held low during power gating.
A longer sleep duration allows VDD V to reach a lower voltage, and will cause more
cells to lose their stored values. In this way, controlling the sleep duration controls
the minimum voltage applied to the DFF cells. By observing the failures that occur
for each different sleep duration (i.e. at each different minimum VDD V voltage), it
becomes possible to learn which cells are more or less failure prone than others. This
idea of controlling power gating duration as a proxy for controlling supply voltage is a
key idea of our work. The complexity of circuit required to control timing is trivial
compared to that of controlling voltage. Digital-to-time converters can be made small
and inexpensive, whereas the ability to control the supply voltage to a particular block
of storage cells requires at least a regulator and additional voltage domain.
The simulation result in Fig. 3.5 shows the decay of VDD V during the sleep time,
using a test circuit with 30 DFF cells built with 45nm PTM library [127]. In Fig.
3.5a, a relatively shorter sleep duration is applied and no DFF cells lose their values
because VDD V remains sufficiently high. When the sleep time increases (Fig. 3.5c), a
lower voltage is reached and more DFF cells lose their written “0” state and transition
to the “1” state when power is restored after gating.

3.3.3

Impact of Temperature

The lowest voltage reached by VDD V during power gating is related not only to
the duration of power gating, but also to the temperature. A high temperature will
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Figure 3.4: A group of DFF cells with a PMOS sleep transistor added for power gating.
When the sleep signal is low, the sleep transistor is on, and the DFF cells operate as
normal. When the sleep signal is high, VDD V will decay and may cause cells to lose
state. The amount of decay in VDD V depends on the duration of the sleep signal as
well as temperature.

cause VDD V to decay more quickly. To examine the temperature-sensitivity of VDD V ,
we simulate its decay under different temperatures from 0 o 100

Given the same

sleep duration, the simulation result in Fig. 3.6 shows that, VDD V decays faster at
higher temperature.

3.4

Extracting A Signature From Failure Rates

In this section, we extract a fingerprint that is based on failure counts of a collection
of storage elements, in our case DFFs. Failure count is measured by adaptively
subjecting the cells to a variety of different power gating durations, and counting how
many of these power gating trials cause each cell to fail. By observing the number of
failures (i.e. the failure count), we learn the failure propensity of each cell relative
to the overall population; in a simple case, if one cell fails 8 times while other cells
have a median of 3 failures, then it is known that the chosen cell is particularly prone
to failures. Yet, we must supply the right conditions to make this determination. If
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Figure 3.5: The simulation results of 30 DFF cells during power gating. All of the
initial written values to the cells are “0”. In Fig. 3.5a, no cells lose their “0” state
because of the short sleep duration. In the longer power gating durations of Fig. 3.5b
and 3.5c, more cells fail to retain the original states. This is caused by the natural
bias in DFF; when the supply voltage decreases, the Q competes with Q̄, and a low
enough supply voltage leads to a data retention failure.
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Figure 3.6: Decay of VDD V during power gating at different temperatures. A higher
temperature speeds up the decay of VDD V .

applying power gating scenarios that cause no cells to fail, or all cells to fail, then
nothing is learned. Ideally, we therefore seek to apply conditions that cause half of
cells to fail.
Fig. 3.7a shows the number of cells that fail for different durations of power gating.
This data is obtained by linearly sweeping the duration of power gating after writing
“0” to 10,000 DFF cells, and counting failures when power is restored. Because the
DFF cells are biased toward the “1” state, almost all cells fail when the power gating
is long enough. To build DFF PUFs based on the failure count feature, we propose a
two-step scheme comprising an enrollment process and a key (response) generation
process.

3.4.1

Enrollment Process

Enrollment would happen at the manufacturer when the chip is created, and key
generation would occur in the field to produce the secret key. The enrollment phase is
described in Proc. 6. Repeatedly, all DFF cells under test are written with 0, then
power is gated for some time and subsequently restored, and the cells are checked to
see whether they have retained the written value. The duration of power gating is
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Figure 3.7: Simulation results showing that the percentage of DFF cells experiencing
retention failures varies with the duration of power gating and for different temperatures. Increasing the sleep duration causes more cells to fail. Additionally, increasing
temperature speeds up retention failures because VDD V decays faster at higher temperatures (see Fig. 3.6). The plot at right shows specific sleep durations that are
explored by binary search seeking to find the gating duration that causes 50% of cells
to fail at each temperature.

58

Procedure 6 Enrollment phase, characterize and sort the failure count of a set of
DFF cells, generate the helper data H based on the given key K.
Input: DFF: a set of indexed DFF cells
Input: An n-bit key K = (k0 , k1 , . . . , kn−1 )

Output: H = h0 , h1 , . . . , hn−1
1: FC = Count-Failure(DFF)
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:

DFFHF C ← {∀j ∈ DFF | F C(j) > 70th percentile}
DFFLF C ← {∀j ∈ DFF | F C(j) < 30th percentile}
for i := 0 to n − 1 do
if (ki == 1) then
choose hi at random from DFFHF C
remove hi from DFFHF C
else
choose hi at random from DFFLF C
remove hi from DFFLF C
end if
end for
return H

varied at each trial, and the total number of failures observed in each cell is counted
across all trials. This procedure records the failure count of all DFF cells. and creates
two sets of cell indices: DFFHF C containing the indices of the 30 percent of cells with
the most failures, and DFFLF C containing the indices of the 30 percent of cells with
the fewest failures. The cells that are close to the median failure counts are not in
either set. The two sets of cell addresses are used to map a chosen key K to helper

data H = h0 , h1 . . . hn−1 . The helper data will subsequently be used to regenerate
the key. The helper data need not be secret, but an adversary should not be allowed
to manipulate helper data.

3.4.2

Key Generation Process

In the field, the helper data and new measurements of failure counts can be used to
generate the enrolled key. The task of key generation is to discover, for each cell index
in the helper data, whether that cell is unusually prone to failure or unusually resistant
to failure relative to the overall cell population. The key generation procedure is given
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in Proc. 7. In this scheme, the PUF outputs are chosen by mapping each DFF index
in the helper data to a corresponding 0 or 1 output according to whether its failure
count is above or below the median failure count of the cells. Note that the helper
data is the only state retained from the enrollment, and that all failure counts, and
the computed median failure count, are obtained from the new measurements in the
field. The relative failure counts obtained during key generation can differ from those
used at enrollment, and it is for this reason that the enrollment chooses only cells in
the upper or lower 30% of failure counts; as long as a cell that was in the upper (or
lower) 30% of failure counts during enrollment remains in the upper (or lower) 50%
during key generation, then the output will be correctly generated.

3.4.3

Binary Search

If sleep durations are not carefully chosen, many of the applied sleep durations
may yield little discriminating information. For example, a very long sleep duration
may cause all cells to fail and this tells nothing about relative failure propensities
of cells. Noting that the most discriminating power gating durations are the ones
that cause half of cells to fail, we propose to use for the Count-Failure routine in
key generation (Proc. 7) a binary search procedure that adapts the gating duration
in search of the specific gating duration that induces 50% failures. The number of
failures for each cell is counted over the steps of the binary search. For the same cells
shown in Fig. 3.7a, the markers on the plot in Fig. 3.7b show the specific power gating
durations that are explored by a binary search algorithm at each temperature, and
the fraction of cells that fail in each power gating trial. It can be observed that the
algorithm targets the 50% failure duration, and thus the data points are clustered
around 50% for each temperature. Note two key features of the proposed approach:
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Procedure 7 PUF response generation: generate responses R from a set of DFF
cells using helper data H.
Input: DFF: a set of indexed DFF cells

Input: H = h0 , h1 , . . . , hn−1

Output: R = r1 , r2 , . . . , rn−1
1:

FC = Count-Failure(DFF)

2:

for i := 0 to n − 1 do

if (F C(hi ) ≥ median F C(j) then

3:

∀j∈DFF

ri ←1

4:

else

5:

ri ←0

6:

end if

7:
8:

end for

9:

return R
• It is adaptive, and for any temperature will find the appropriate gating duration
to provide highly discriminating failure counts that separate the most failureprone cells from the least failure-prone cells.
• It implicitly has characteristics of a majority voting scheme in the sense of being
robust to noise-induced upsets during a single power-gating trial.

3.4.4

Experiment Results

We evaluate the reliability of the failure count based DFF PUFs and depict the
results in Fig. 6.7. The figure shows, for different number of iterations, the mean PUF
reliability across 500 trials and the reliability obtained by comparing data from 25◦ C
to 100◦ C. For comparison, we show that the same PUF reliability can be obtained
by using random durations of power gating, but this requires more trials because
it is does not target highly informative trials. In the case of random power gating,
the durations are randomly chosen from the range 0 to 50 µ. When the number of
iterations increases, the failure counts produced are better able to identify which cells
are unusually prone to failure or unusually resistant to failure. Given that power
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gating iterations will increase runtime, there exists a tradeoff between runtime and
the reliability of the generated keys, but in either binary search or random durations,
a larger number of iterations will improve key reliability. To maximize reliability in a
small number of trials, binary search is a better choice.

3.5

Summary

In this chapter, we propose a novel method to use power gating to build reliable
PUFs from failure signatures in CMOS storage elements such as D flip-flops. The
work is notable in its ability to generate high quality identifiers from biased cells,
and it performs best when cells are biased. The method exploits power gating as
a mechanism to extract a chip-specific ordering of failures across cells, and does so
without requiring the expensive voltage control that was needed by previous works in
this area. The method is shown to be reliable and can use either random durations
of power gating or an efficient adaptive method to characterize failure counts across
temperatures.
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Figure 3.8: Plot shows the reliability of generated keys produced using binary search
and random durations of power gating. The key values are enrolled to the cells at
25◦ C using Proc. 6 and then the keys are generated at 25◦ C and 100◦ C using Proc. 7.
The binary search is able to produce highly reliable keys using fewer power gating
trials because it seeks out gating durations that are most capable of distinguishing
the cells that are failure prone from those that are not. The plotted data is averaged
over 500 trials.
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CHAPTER 4
SECURITY EVALUATION AND ENHANCEMENT OF
BISTABLE RING PUFS

Bistable Ring (BR) Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a newly proposed but
promising hardware security primitive in PUF family. The novel architecture not
only makes it capable of generating exponential responses, but also being harder to
model and machine learn than the Arbiter PUF. In this chapter, we evaluate the
security of Bistable Ring PUF by applying different attacking models and methods,
besides the proposed attacks in other literatures, we propose a novel model based on
Support Vector Machine (SVM). XORing method is employed to enhance the attack
resilience of single BR PUF, we demonstrate that XORed BR PUF is beyond the
reach of current known attacking models, thus is secure.

4.1

Introduction

At TRUST 2014, Hesselbarth and Schuster [98] succeeded in revealing some basic
vulnerabilities of the BR PUF against ML techniques. They proved that BR PUFs can
be attacked by a single layer artificial neural network (ANN) with prediction errors
between close to 0% and 20%, varying from hardware instance to instance. Among
the 20 FPGA instances examined, 14 could be predicted with errors less than 10%.
This puts close limits on the security usability of the BR PUF on FPGAs. Schuster
and Hesselbarth subsequently proposed a small design improvement, so-called twisted
BR PUFs (TBR PUFs), which they conjectured to possess better security. Using their
own ANN algorithm, they were also able to attack TBR PUFs again. However, the
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TBR PUF shows average higher prediction errors with respect to ANNs, indicating
that TBR PUFs has some improvements over plain BR PUFs. It remained open in
[98] whether said improvement is sufficient for secure practical usage of the TBR PUF.
Our Contributions In this chapter, we re-examine the security of the BR PUF
and TBR PUF closely, again using FPGA implementations. We thereby make the
following new contributions:
• We implement 8 instances of the BR PUF and the TBR PUF on FPGA. To
achieve a more comprehensive ML analysis, we implement bitlengths other and
larger than 64, namely also 32, 128 and 256. These bitlengths had never before
been implemented in silicon and studied in the literature.
• We develop the first analytical models for the BR PUF and the TBR PUF.
• We use these new models in order to apply, for the first time, support vector
machines (SVMs) to the BR PUF and the TBR PUF. This more powerful
ML-tool drastically improves the ML predication rates relative to previous work.
None of our 8 instances has a prediction error exceeding 5%. This result answers
the open question of Hesselbarth and Schuster whether certain individual and
particularly hard instances of the BR PUF or TBR PUF could be used securely
in practice: In our findings, this was not the case.
• We then propose a new, efficient strategy for the secure practical use of the BR
PUF: namely the employment of l instances in parallel, whose l outputs are
XORed at the end in order to produce one single-bit PUF-response. We call the
resulting structure XOR BR PUF. We show that even for small values of l such
as 4, this structure cannot be machine learned by our current techniques, while
it is still sufficiently stable in practice. This work is the first study of XOR BR
PUFs in the literature.
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses our attacks on the BR
PUF, while Section 4.3 details our attacks on the TBR PUF. Section 4.4 suggests
the use of XOR BR PUFs and evaluates their performance improvement. Section 4.5
concludes this chapter.

4.2
4.2.1

SVM Attack on BR PUFs
Mechanism of BR PUF

A ring oscillator (RO) is a device composed of an odd number of logically-inverting
delay elements. Since the output of the last element is always the logical “NOT” of the
first input, an RO will continually oscillate. Derived from the non-settling structure
of RO, BR PUF is a ring comprising an even number of inverting cells. Such a design
behaves like a memory cell and will fall into one of two possible stable states: either
“101010...” or “010101...”.
As depicted in Fig. 4.1, a 64-bit BR PUF is composed of 64 stages, where each
stage has two inverting delay elements (NOR gates as an example). A challenge vector
C = {c1 , c2 , . . . , cn } selects the NOR gates used in each bistable ring configuration by
providing values to the MUX and DEMUX gates of the stages. Since each NOR gate
has unique process variation, each different challenge vector creates a unique bistable
ring configuration, and in total 264 different configurations can be created. A common
“RESET” signal is added to each stage to establish a known “all-0” state before letting
the ring stabilize to produce its response. Evaluation of the response begins when
“RESET” is released and the ring starts to oscillate through the selected NOR gates.
Once a stable state is reached, the outputs of any two adjacent stages will be logical
compliments of each other, either “10” or “01”. The choice among the two possible
stable states of the ring depends on noise and the process variation of the NOR gates
used in the ring configuration. Any interconnection node between two stages can be
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used as an output port, and in this work we use the half bit-length port to read out
the response (Fig. 4.1).
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Figure 4.1: Schematic of a single BR-PUF with 64 stages.

4.2.2

Intuition for Modeling BR PUF

The intuition for our modeling attack is that the response can predicted based on
a summation of weights. Such an additive model is commonly used for predicting the
responses of Arbiter PUFs, where the weights represent stage delays [59]. An additive
model has also been used for predicting the resolution of metastability [38], with
weights representing the strength with which different cells pull toward a particular
outcome. We similarly use an additive model in this work; the weight we associate
with each gate represents the difference between its pull-up strength and pull-down
strength. The weights are summed across all gates used by a challenge to find the
overall favored response for that challenge; a positive sum indicates a preference for the
positive response. Note that the summation of weights requires negative and positive
polarities because the positive overall response is favored by the pull-up strength of
even stages and the pull-down strength of odd stages.
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4.2.3

Model

Let the difference between the pull-up and pull-down strength of the top NOR
gate in the ith stage be represented by ti , and in the bottom NOR gate in the ith stage
be represented by bi . The even stages will contribute toward the positive response
with strength ti (or bi if the challenge bit selects the bottom NOR gate of the stage),
and the odd stages will contribute toward the positive response with strength −ti (or
−bi ). To account more generally for even-ness or odd-ness, the strength of the ith
stage toward the positive response can be written as −1i ti if the challenge bit is 0,
and −1i bi if the challenge bit is 1. For a given 64-bit challenge, the total strength
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Figure 4.2: Prediction rate of SVM modeling attacks on BR PUFs. When the length
of the BR PUF increases, more CRPs are required to train the model to achieve 95%
prediction. Note that the scale of the x-axes are not consistent across the subfigures.
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For convenience we define αi and βi (Eq. 4.1) such that αi + βi = −1i ti and
αi − βi = −1i bi . This notation allows the pull of the ith stage toward the positive
response to be written generally as αi + ci βi with challenge bit ci ∈ {−1, 1}. The
summed strengths toward the positive response for any challenge vector C is r(C) as
shown in Eq. 4.2. According to our formulation, if the ti and bi weights were known
explicitly, then the response could be predicted by the sign of R(C) (Eq. 4.2).

i

αi = −1



ti − bi
2



R(C) = sgn(

i



βi = −1

X

αi + ci βi )

ti + bi
2


(4.1)

(4.2)

i=0..n−1

Given that weights are not known, since there are only two possible responses of BR
PUFs, based on the model above, we can convert the response prediction of BR PUFs
into a classification problem. Support Vector Machines (SVM) are powerful learning
tools that can perform binary classification of data, the classification is realized with
building a hyperplane separating surface. While digesting the known input and output
data sets, the hyperplane separating surface will be curved to minimize the error of
predicted values.
Known CRPs are used to train the classifier to predict responses from challenges.
In the SVM formulation, first note that the αi terms in Eq. 4.2 can be discarded
because they are constant for a given PUF instance across all challenges. Only ci βi
terms remain, and from these terms the response must be predicted. Given a set of
challenges and associated responses, the training examples therefore have as their
feature vector an applied challenge Cj ∈ {−1, 1}n and as their labels the observed
response R(Cj ) ∈ {−1, 1} to challenge Cj . Note that βi terms do not appear explicitly
in the SVM formulation as the classifier simply works to find the maximum margin
hyperplane to separate the challenges into two classes according to their responses.
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4.2.4

SVM Attacks on BR PUFs

To explore the effectiveness of SVM attacks, we implemented on a Xilinx SpartanVI FPGA board, 8 BR PUFs with lengths of 32-, 64-, 128- and 256 bits, and collected
1,000,000 CRPs from each of them (to decrease the impact of measurement noise, all
of the final CRPs are formulated by majority voting from 11 repeated measurements).
SVM attacks are implemented with a linear kernel to mimic the operation of single
BR PUFs (note that to attack XOR BR PUFs, SVM model with a polynomial kernel
is utilized, where the poly-order of the model is set as the XORing complexity of
BR PUFs). The results of SVM attacks are shown as Fig. 4.2. To demonstrate the
relationship between prediction rate and CRPs used for different PUF lengths, we
utilize 95% as a threshold prediction rate. It is clear that while the size of BR PUF is
increasing, the demand for CRPs is also increasing to build its ML model. However,
for any tested size of BR PUF, the SVM modeling attack is successful in predicting
responses. This means a single BR PUF is not secure, even if it has a large number of
stages.

4.3
4.3.1

Twisted BR PUFs Attack
Model of TBR PUFs

Uniformity, or fractional Hamming weight, is an important feature of PUFs. A
good PUF that produces an equal number of 0 and 1 responses will have a uniformity
of around 0.50. However, the uniformity of CRPs of BR PUF implementations has
been found to be biased in previous work [98] (see also Sec. 4.4.3.3 in this work). To
compensate for this drawback, TBR-PUF was proposed in [98]. Compared to the BR
PUF, the TBR-PUF has a more compact design; when applying a challenge vector to
the TBR PUF, all of its 2n inverting elements are used in the ring. By contrast, in
the standard BR PUF, half of the NOR gates in the circuit are unused for any given
challenge. Taking the TBR PUF in Fig. 4.3 as an example, using challenge bit c0 = 1
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or c0 = 0 will change the location of D00 and D10 in the ring, but in either case D00 and
D10 will both contribute in some polarity to the response.
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RESET
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Figure 4.3: Schematic of a single TBR-PUF with 64 stages.

From Sec. 4.2, we know that a ring composed of an even number of inverting
elements will stabilize according to the summed strength of the pull-up and pull-down
strengths of each gate. The TBR PUF uses pull-up and pull-down strengths of all
inverting components in the circuit, but only the polarity (i.e. even-ness or odd-ness)
of each element toward the overall ring response changes with the challenge vector.
According to the interconnections of the 64-bit TBR PUF, the two NOR gates in the
ith stage are the ith and 127 − ith element in the overall ring. Because one element is
odd in the overall ring, and one is even, the pull-up strength of the top and bottom
gates in each stage are working against each other. Therefore, the overall contribution
toward the positive response is βi (Eq. 4.3), or −βi if the ith challenge bit is negative.
The overall sum of weights pulling toward the positive response for challenge C is
therefore R(C) (Eq. 4.4). Eq. 4.2 and Eq. 4.4 differ only in in the physical meaning
P
of βi , and in Eq. 4.2 having an additional offset term of i αi , but in terms of ML
modeling they are actually the same identical model. Therefore, the complexity of ML
attacks on the TBR PUF is the same as the complexity of attacking the BR PUF.

βi = −1i (ti − bi )
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(4.3)

R(C) = sgn(

X

ci β i )

(4.4)
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Figure 4.4: Prediction rate of SVM modeling attacks on TBR PUFs of different bit
lengths. As in Fig. 4.2, to achieve same prediction rate, a larger PUF requires more
CRPs.

4.3.2

SVM Attacks on TBR PUFs

Given that we have shown the model of a TBR PUF to be the same as that of
a BR PUF, we can again train an SVM classifier to predict its responses to each
challenge. Eight TBR PUFs are implemented with Spartan-VI FPGA boards, and
1,000,000 CRPs are collected from each of them. For each CRP, majority voting over
11 repeated measurements of the response to a challenge are performed in order to
reduce the impact of noise.
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Following the experiment in Sec. 4.2.4, SVM attacks with polynomial kernel are
applied on TBR PUFs of 32-, 64-, 128- and 256 bit-length (the poly-order of the model
is set as the XORing complexity). The results in Fig. 4.4 show that the modeling
attacks succeed in modeling all different sizes of the TBR PUF, with prediction rate
no lower than 95%.

4.4

XORing BR PUFs to Enhance the Security

It is possible using ML to model the behavior of a single strong PUF like the
Arbiter PUF [59]. To thwart modeling attacks, an XOR function was proposed as
a way to enhance security of Arbiter PUFs [103] and lightweight PUFs [71]. In an
XOR PUF, the same challenge vector is applied to l single PUFs in parallel, and
their outputs are XORed together to form a one-bit response. XORing is an efficient
method to enhance the security of strong PUFs, because the XOR function obfuscates
the CRPs of the individual PUFs [103]. Inspired by this idea, we propose to use XOR
strategies on BR PUFs to improve their resistance to modeling attacks.

4.4.1

Review of Existing Attacks on XOR PUFs

The addition of XOR functions increases the resistance of strong PUF against
modeling attacks. Both the training time and number of CRPs required to train
a model increase exponentially with the number of XORed PUFs [93]. Attacking
XOR-based Arbiter PUFs with more than five parallel Arbiter PUFs was stated as
difficult based on pure ML modeling [90]. Later works devised a more powerful class
of hybrid attacks that combine side channels with ML [95, 115]. Power and timing
side-channels allow information about the sub-responses (i.e. the responses of single
PUFs before the final XOR) of XORed PUFs to be extracted and used to improve
the prediction rate of ML models. In light of these hybrid attacks, if the side-channel
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No. of
XORs
2

3

4

Bit
Length
32
64
128
256
32
64
128
256
32
64
128
256

CRPs
(×103 )
0.8
4
18
—–
1.2
7.2
—–
—–
—–
—–
—–
—–

Predict.
Rate
95%
95%
95%
50.8%
95%
95%
50.1%
50.1%
50.1%
50.3%
49.8%
50.1%

Training*
Time
3 sec
10 sec
6 mins
—–
5 sec
24 sec
—–
—–
—–
—–
—–
—–

Table 4.1: The run times and number of CRPs that are required for SVM attacks
on the XOR BR PUFs of different sizes. Prediction rates around 50% imply that
the SVM model can not break XOR BR PUFs of these complexity. *Note that the
training time is greatly determined by the computational systems.

information of BR PUFs can also be measured, then the use of XOR will not be an
effective way to enhance the security.

4.4.2

SVM Modeling Attacks on XORed BR PUF

Adopting the model of single BR PUF in Sec. 4.2, for an XOR BR PUF employing
l BR PUFs, the XORed response to a challenge C can be described by Eq. 4.5. Note
the similarity between this formula and the formula of the single BR PUF (Eq. 4.2).
The only modification is that now each stage has l different α and β terms, one for
each of the PUFs. The overall response is based on how many of the individual PUFs
have a positive response.
n−1
l−1 X
Y

R(C) = sgn
(
αi,j + ci βi,j )

(4.5)

j=0 i=0

In applying SVM to XOR BR PUF, it is found that we can only break the
complexity up to 2 XOR for 128-bit length and 3 XOR for 64-bit length. The number
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of CRPs and runtime1 for SVM modeling attacks against XOR BR PUFs are listed in
Tab. 4.1. We can surmise that XOR BR PUFs with 4 or more XORed outputs are
beyond the reach of current SVM modeling attacks.

4.4.3

Performance Evaluation of XORed BR PUF

While the basic motivation of XORing BR PUF is to resist modeling attacks, the
impact of the XOR on other key metrics must also be considered. In this section, we
evaluate the impact of the XOR function on reliability, uniqueness, and uniformity.

4.4.3.1

Reliability

Reliability is the ratio of consistent CRPs when a PUF is operating in different
environment conditions such as temperature. To evaluate the reliability of XOR BR
PUFs, 8 BR PUFs are measured across different temperatures between 27◦ C and
75◦ C, with a 4◦ C step, using a Sun Electronics EC12 Environmental Chamber [105]
to control the temperature (Fig. 4.5a). Reliability is evaluated by comparing CRPs
collected at 27◦ C to CRPs collected at other temperatures. For a XOR PUF, any
unstable sub-response can cause the XORed response to be unreliable. Therefore, the
reliability at any temperature will decrease with the number of PUFs that are XORed
together (Fig. 6.7). According to the first BR PUF paper [15], an effective solution to
solve this problem is employing CRPs that settle down quickly, since those CRPs are
less sensitive to noise.

4.4.3.2

Uniqueness

Uniqueness is the capability of a PUF to distinguish itself from other instances.
Uniqueness is quantified as the fraction of responses that are different across instances
when the same challenges are applied. Thus for m PUF instances, a total of

1

The computer used has a common Intel 3630QM quadcore processor.
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Figure 4.5: Evaluating reliability across different temperatures. Because the reliability
of each single BR PUF decreases with temperature, the reliability of the XOR BR
PUF results degrade significantly.

uniqueness values are obtained. To better explore the uniqueness of XOR BR PUF,
we compute its within-class (response flipping by noise, temperature noise here) and
between-class uniqueness (response difference between instances), these results are
depicted in Fig. 4.6.

4.4.3.3

Uniformity

Uniformity denotes the average response of a PUF, the ideal value of which is 0.5,
meaning equal amount of “1” and “0” responses. Uniformity that is far away from 0.5
will have less response entropy and be easier to attack with modeling [123]. In our
experiment, the uniformity of a single BR PUF is found to be highly biased, and this
phenomenon was also reported in [98] [123]. The XOR function helps to remove this
bias.
To validate the uniformity improvement from the XOR function, we collected the
CRPs from eight 64-bit BR PUFs from FPGA (without CRP majority voting). It
is found that some PUF instances show extreme bias, but XORing more single BR
PUFs together decreases response bias (Fig. 4.7).

76

0.1

0

0.5
XOR=2

0

1

0

0.5
XOR=3

0.1

0

0.5
XOR=5

0

0

0.5
XOR=4

1

0.2

0.1

1

0.1

0

1

0.2
frequency

frequency

0.2

0

0.1

frequency

0

0.2
frequency

0.2
frequency

frequency

0.2

0

0.5
XOR=6

within
between
0.1

0

1

0

0.5
XOR=7

1

Figure 4.6: The between-class and within-class Hamming distance of XOR PUFs.
Even when XORing together more BR PUFs, the within-class and between-class
Hamming distances can still be differentiated. The results are based on 8 BR PUFs,
thus there is only one 8 XOR BR PUF and no uniqueness is formulated for it.
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Figure 4.7: The response uniformity of a single BR PUF (represented by “XOR=1”
in plot) is highly biased. When more BR PUFs are XORed together, the uniformity
is closer to 0.5.
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4.5

Summary

In this chapter, we studied two relatively new PUF variants: BR PUF and its
derived architecture TBR PUF. Their resilience against ML modeling attacks is
explored and it is shown that their response can be predicted with success rate
exceeding 95% using reasonable runtime and less than 10k CRPs in all cases. Our
work confirms that neither a single BR, nor TBR, PUF is secure. To strengthen the
BR PUF against modeling attacks, we proposed and evaluated an XOR BR PUF
variant. It is found that XORing 4 or more BR PUFs together produces a behavior
that is beyond the modeling capability of current SVM ML attacks, and also improves
other key PUF metrics like uniformity. Future work will explore the effectiveness of
other modeling attacks, like Evolutionary Strategy and Logistic Regression methods.
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CHAPTER 5
USING STATISTICAL MODELS TO IMPROVE THE
RELIABILITY OF DELAY-BASED PUFS

In previous chapters, we present the effectiveness of using ML modeling to attack
PUF primitives. This chapter addresses two causes of unreliability: transient unreliability caused by environmental noise, and persistent unreliability caused by device
aging. To improve reliability, we constructively apply Machine Learning modeling,
and use the models to predict and then discard challenge-response pairs (CRPs) that
will be unreliable with respect to noise and aging on a given PUF instance. The
proposed method provides flexibility to control error rate by deciding what percentage
of challenges to discard. Our experiments find that a PUF with nominal reliability of
91% can be made fully reliable by discarding only 20% of challenges.

5.1

Introduction

Though many PUF architectures have been proposed, reliability is still a problem
that is common to all PUFs. PUF responses are unreliable because supply voltage
(VDD ) and temperature (T ) variations can overcome the impacts of process variations
and flip the outputs. Because a PUF operating in different conditions can generate a
different response to the same challenge vector, the PUF output is therefore a function
of not only the challenge and process variations, but also of transient environmental
conditions.
It is desirable for a PUF to generate highly reliable responses over its lifetime.
However, device aging is an important but rarely studied source of unreliability in
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PUFs. Unlike environmental noise that temporarily flip PUFs’ challenge-response
pairs (CRPs) (PUF work more reliably when VDD and T return back to normal),
device aging causes a permanent change in the behavior of a PUF. Device aging is
usually caused by negative bias temperature instability (NBTI), hot carrier injection
(HCI), time dependent dielectric breakdown (TDDB), and electromigration [50] [62].
In this work, we focus on NBTI and HCI in particular. NBTI impacts the threshold
voltage of pMOS transistors and decreases the speed of circuitry. Besides varying the
threshold voltage of nMOS transistors, HCI also narrows the effective channel length
of transistors. To build a comprehensive reliability model, aging must be considered
in addition to environmental noise.
To make a PUF highly reliable, unstable CRPs that are easily flipped by environmental noise and aging should not be used. We propose a modeling technique to
achieve this goal that requires no extra circuitry other than a normal PUF. Based on
our method, a user applies a random set of challenges to a PUF, and obtains responses.
From the CRPs, the user trains a Machine Learning (ML) model that can predict the
reliability of responses to any challenge. He then uses the model to ensure that he
discards unreliable challenges and only applies challenges for which the responses are
highly reliable. In the experimental validation with 64−bit Arbiter PUFs (can also be
applied to other PUFs), our technique can help to achieve greater than 99% reliability
at the cost of only 0.21 seconds of computation time and 1500 training CRPs to build
the model. Larger training sets lead to better modes and further improve reliability.
Before this work, ML was always utilized to attack PUFs, so our work is novel in
using ML modeling constructively to improve reliability. The contributions of this
work are as follows:
• We classify the unreliability source of a PUF into two aspects: transient noise and
aging; the reliability impact of both aspects are analyzed.
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Figure 5.1: Schematic of an Arbiter PUF. Challenge C controls the propagation paths
of rising edges that gather delay mismatch as they propagate toward the final arbiter.

• We train a ML model for PUF characterization and utilize the model for identifying
and filtering out the unreliable challenge vectors for each PUF, allowing higher
reliability to be achieved.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 analyzes PUF unreliability
caused by environmental noise and aging. Section 5.3 presents the use of ML modeling
techniques to filter out unreliable CRPs. Section 5.4 presents experimental validation
of the proposed approach. Section 5.5 presents directions for future work and concludes
this chapter.

5.2

Analysis of Unreliable CRPs

A n−bit Arbiter PUF is composed of n stages, with each stage employing two 2:1
MUXs as depicted in Fig. 5.1. A challenge vector C = {c1 , c2 , . . . cn } is applied as
the control signals for all stages to configure two paths through the PUF toward the
arbiter; at each stage the paths are configured to be either straight or crossing. Thus,
a rising edge applied at the input of the first stage gathers the delay mismatch from
the paths through each stage while propagating toward the arbiter. The arbiter is a
latch that digitizes the response into “1” or “0” by judging which rising edge is the
first to arrive.
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Figure 5.2: Propagation paths through the delay cells of an arbiter PUF.

5.2.1

Challenge and Response Pairs

A CRP can be considered reliable only if a PUF is capable of repeating this input/output relationship, even under different conditions (temperature, supply voltage,
aging). Thus, before analyzing the unreliability of a PUF, it is meaningful to explore
the relationship between its input and output. In an n-bit Arbiter PUF (Fig. 5.1), we
define the propagation delay from the input to the first stage to the top and bottom
i
i
outputs of the ith stage as Dtop
and Dbottom
respectively. The delay mismatch between
n
n
two delay paths is summed up as the timing difference between Dtop
and Dbottom
(Fig.

5.2). By mapping original challenge ci ∈ {0, 1} into ci ∈ {−1, 1} we get:
1 + ci i
i−1
(ttop + Dtop
)
2
1 − ci i
i−1
+
(tu across + Dbottom
)
2
1 + ci i
i−1
i
(tbottom + Dbottom
)
Dbottom
=
2
1 − ci i
i−1
+
(td across + Dtop
)
2
i
Dtop
=

(5.1)

0
0
where Dtop
= Dbottom
= 0, and titop , tibottom , tiu across , tid across represent the four possible

delays through the ith stage. Denoting the delay difference between top and bottom
n
n
arbiter inputs as DD, following Eq. 5.1, we get DD = Dtop
− Dbottom
. The response

(r) of an Arbiter PUF of n-bit length is therefore determined by the sign of DD (Eq.
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5.2).

r=




0, if sgn(DD) > 0

(5.2)



1, if sgn(DD) < 0
From Eq.5.2, we can deduce that a PUF response is flipped when the sign of DD
changes, from positive to negative or vice versa.

5.2.2
5.2.2.1

Environmental Noise and Aging
Environmental Noise

To explore the impact of noise in more detail, we perform simulations on a set of
64−bit Arbiter PUFs. In this simulation, in addition to measuring the arbiter output
that depends on DD, we also sampled Dtop and Dbottom to compute DD. Responses
and DD values for 50k random challenges are collected under 1.1V and 28◦ C and used
as a golden set. Furthermore, we repeated this collection under altered supply voltage
and temperature points (to mimic practical situation, random noise is considered in all
simulations). Two noise models: flicker and channel thermal noise are adopted in our
simulation. Flicker noise is a frequency dependent noise caused by charge fluctuation
in oxide traps, while channel thermal noise reflects voltage fluctuations due to the
random motion of electrons. Parameters f noimod and tnoimod in the BSIM41 are
used to add flicker and thermal noise respectively;2 noise is therefore modeled on all
transistors in the circuit. The flipped responses are from challenges that, in the golden
set, correspond to DD in a small range:
1

BSIM4 model is based on the industry standard efforts of the Compact Modeling Counsel and
the BSIM modeling group at UC Berkeley.
2

the values assigned to the three parameters comprising f noimod are noia = 6.25e41, noib =
3.125e26, noic = 8.75; the values assigned to the parameters comprising tnoimod are ntnoi = 1, tnoia
= 1.5e6 and tnoib = 3.5e6
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Figure 5.3: Exact delay difference DD of two sets: 50k golden samples (colored in
cyan), the subset of samples flipped by aging and noise (colored in blue).

DDumin ≤ DD ≤ DDumax

(5.3)

For CRP data from Arbiter PUF, DDumax therefore denotes the maximum DD
among unreliable challenges, and DDumin denotes the minimum DD among unreliable
challenges. If only the challenge vectors that satisfy either DD > DDumax or DD <
DDumin are applied to the PUF, then the PUF will be reliable and not prone to flipped
response bits. For our simulated 64-bit PUFs based on 45nm Predictive Technology
Model (PTM) [127], it is found that DDumax − DDumin = 22.6ps when considering
noise, voltage and temperature fluctuations (Fig. 5.3). However, in practice, it is
impossible to directly filter out challenge vectors that induce large values of DD
because 1) DD cannot be measured directly, as the arbiter input signals are not
externally observable; and 2) even if it were possible to measure DD (e.g. using
time-to-digital conversion [58]), it is infeasible to measure DD for all 2n challenges as
would be required for an n-stage PUF . As will be shown in Section 5.3, we overcome
both of these limitations using a machine learning model to predict DD based on the
responses produced at arbiter outputs.
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5.2.2.2

Aging

In previous literature, aging is rarely considered as a source of unreliability. Unlike
environmental variations, the impact of aging on transistors is permanent. The
most common aging effects include NBTI and HCI, both of which can degrade the
performance of a circuit. NBTI mainly changes the threshold voltage of transistors,
thus causing decreased drive current and lower operating speed. HCI arises as a
result of the aggressive scaling of device geometries, most notably for narrowing
device channel length. Shorter channel length means higher circuit speed, but this
also increases electric fields in the channel. As a result, these fields can damage the
gate-oxide interface, resulting in degradation in device performance. The amount of
degradation varies across devices and is a function of the switching activity of a device
within a circuit. Thus, for a circuit that relies on physical process variations like a
PUF, aging can introduce permanent unreliability.
To mimic the aging of Arbiter PUFs, we use Cadence Ultrasim as our infrastructure
and simulate a group of Arbiter PUFs across different age spans: year, month, week,
day, hour and minute. Using un-aged CRPs as golden values, we measure the reliability
degradation due to aging, without the presence of noise or temperature and voltage
fluctuations (Fig. 5.4). It can be seen that after only 1 hour of simulated aging,
about 2% of responses become unreliable with respect to their golden CRPs. This
occurs because some golden CRPs have associated DD values that are close to 0, and
are thus susceptible to be flipped by even a small amount of aging. After a year of
aging, approximately 8% of responses are unreliable compared with golden CRPs.
The range of DD values that were susceptible to flipped responses within a year of
aging fall within a range of DDumax − DDumin = 25.4ps. This indicates that, as with
environmental noise, reliability due to aging can also be mitigated by applying to each
chip only those challenges that induce a large DD.
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Figure 5.4: Aging introduces unreliability to PUFs, if denoting the CRPs of a new
PUF as nominal database, older PUFs becomes more unreliable.

This section has explained that environmental noise and aging degrade PUF
reliability and showed that all of the flipped responses are associated with DD closer
to 0 in the golden data. The observation that unreliable challenges are associated with
small DD values motivates an approach of improving PUF reliability by avoiding the
challenges that induce small DD values on each PUF. The first step toward avoiding
these challenges is to train a model that can predict DD of challenges.

5.3

Modeling DD of a PUF

Based on the analysis in Sec. 5.2, knowing the DD of each challenge vector makes
it possible to get reliable CRPs by avoiding challenges with smaller DD. We treat
these smaller-DD as likely to be unreliable and our goal is therefore to identify and
avoid applying these challenges. However, as probing inside a PUF to measure DD
is not practical, we instead predict DD using ML modeling method, that requires
no silicon overhead other than a normal PUF circuit. To get the value of DD, we
decompose an Arbiter PUF and mimic the generation process of its responses. Here
we firstly define two parameters as:
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αi = (titop − tibottom + tid across − tiu across )/2
βi =

(titop

−

tibottom

−

tid across

+

(5.4)

tiu across )/2

Based on Eq. 5.4, for a given challenge vector C = {c1 , c2 , . . . cn }, corresponding
response generation can be modeled by accumulating the delay mismatches through
delay stages as:

DD = α1 k0 + · · · + (αn + βn−1 )kn−1 + βn kn

where kn = 1 and ki =

n
Q

(5.5)

cj , reflecting the number of times that the rising

j=i+1

edges will change tracks between the ith stage and the arbiter. Thus, knowing the
challenge and αi and βi , i ∈ (1 . . . n) makes it possible to compute DD for any
challenge. By denoting the delay parameters of an Arbiter PUF with vector pmodel =
{α1 , α2 + β1 , . . . αn + βn−1 , βn }, and defining challenge features as k = {k0 , k1 . . . kn },
we can formulate the model-predicted DD of each challenge vector as:

DD = hpmodel , ki

(5.6)

Though we can not directly extract individual component delays of the Arbiter
PUF, we can use ML modeling to predict suitable values for pmodel . To accomplish
this, we use a set of known challenge response pairs to train a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classifier. SVM models are powerful learning tools that can perform binary
classification of data, classification is achieved by a linear or nonlinear separating
surface in the input space of the data set. SVMs have been widely used in modeling
attacks on Arbiter PUFs [59, 90, ?]. Note that accurate delay prediction is not an
explicit objective of the SVM model, as the SVM model only seeks a value of pmodel
that will accurately predict responses. However, because responses are determined by
the sign of DD (Eq. 5.2), a model that is trained to predict responses accurately is also
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quite successful in predicting numeric values of DD. Therefore, our approach trains
a binary classifier, and then uses the resulting model to predict the delay difference
induced by each challenge. In turn, we use the predicted delay difference to infer
whether or not a challenge will be reliable if applied to the PUF.
As known, if A is highly correlated with B, the correlation coefficient (corr) between
them should be close to 1, and one can deduce information about B from A. The
correlation can be quantified as:

corr(A, B) =

E[(A − E(A))(B − E(B))]
σA ∗ σB

(5.7)

In our example, denoting the modeled PUF feature with pmodel , we hope that the
model-predicted DD will be close to the golden value of DD that is measured from
simulation. If this model works well for response prediction, then we expect ρ in Eq.
5.8 to be close to 1 when the CRP dataset used to train the model is sufficiently large.

corr(DDgolden , DDmodel ) =
(5.8)
corr(DDgolden , hpmodel , ki) = ρ
To validate the use of SVM classifier for delay prediction, a set of CRPs and
corresponding DDgolden values are extracted from SPICE simulation. We collect 5000
CRPs and apply 60% of them as training set for PUF model building, while other
40% CRPs for model validation. We compute the correlation coefficient (ρ) between
DDgolden (from simulation) and DDmodel , which is calculated as hpmodel , ki. Fig 5.5a
shows that ρ approaches 1 when applying many CRPs for model training. To present
more details about this correlation, random challenges are chosen and DDgolden and
DDmodel (trained on 3000 CRPs) are shown for each one (Fig. 5.5b). Although
DDgolden and DDmodel are different in scale, the correlation between them is very high.
Note that our approach for selecting reliable challenges does not need exact values
but only need accurate relative magnitudes of delay differences to infer reliability.
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Because the predicted DD values from the model are accurate with respect to the
golden values from simulation, we can indeed filter out unreliable challenges of the

correlation coefficient ρ
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Figure 5.5: In (5.5a), the correlation coefficient ρ between golden delay difference and
model-predicted delay difference. While the PUF training size is increasing, higher
ρ is achieved. In (5.5b), based on the model trained with 3000 CRPs, there is good
agreement between DDgolden and DDmodel for 2000 random challenges.
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Procedure 8 Use ML model to compute the range of model-predicted delay differences
that are likely to be unreliable for a given PUF. Challenges predicted to have delay
differences inside this range will not be applied to the PUF, and this will improve the
overall PUF reliability. Reliability can be improved by using a larger value of dr to
discard more challenges.
Input: A discard ratio dr and a set of challenges and corresponding responses obtained
from a single PUF at nominal supply voltage and temperature.
Output: A range [DDmin , DDmax ] of delay differences to consider as unreliable for
this PUF.
1: Let k be the challenges mapped to challenge features (Eq. 5.5 and 5.6)
2: pmodel ← SVM(k, responses) {train the PUF model}
3: µp = avghpmodel ,ki {mean predicted delay difference}
4: σp2 = varhpmodel ,ki {variance of predicted delay difference}
5: the distribution of delay differences across all challenges is modeled to be N (µp , σp2 )
6:
7:

DDmin =F −1 (0.5 − dr/2) = µp + σp Φ−1 (0.5 − dr/2)
DDmax =F −1 (0.5 + dr/2) = µp + σp Φ−1 (0.5 + dr/2) {delay difference cutoffs based
on PUF model pmodel and selected challenge features k (Eq. 5.10)}

8:

return [DDmin , DDmax ]

5.4

Experimental Results

Following the methodology in Sec. 5.3, we use a PUF model to filter out challenge
vectors that are potentially unreliable. In this section, we validate this method with
noise from environment and aging. Based on the findings in Fig. 5.3, flipped responses
are only these satisfying DDumin ≤ DDgolden ≤ DDumax . The main algorithm in our
method uses an SVM classifier to predict delay cutoffs that will rule out approximately
fraction dr of the overall challenge space. However, there are still two questions that
need to be answered when applying this method:
1. How many CRPs are necessary to accurately model the DDumax and DDumin
cutoffs each PUF?
2. What percentage of CRPs must be avoided to achieve a given level of response
reliability?
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Figure 5.6: Illustration of the cumulative distribution function of delay difference DD.
Based on a set of CRPs, we train a PUF model pmodel and use it to compute µp and
σp . Then given a discarded ratio dr, we discard the challenges for which the predicted
DD is between DDmin and DDmax .

The first question is addressed using Alg. 8. For a PUF, assuming that its
physical features follow Gaussian distribution, the corresponding DD distribution
across randomly selected challenges will follow a normal distribution (Fig. 5.3). Our
approach characterizes the distribution of delay difference (DD) by experimentally
determining the mean and variance. For a set of delay difference values, we build its
probability distribution function following Eq. 5.9. The randomness of training set
ensures that it envelopes the unreliable range, µp and σp are defined in Alg. 8. An
illustration about how this function works is shown in Fig. 5.6.
2

(DD−µp )
−
1
2
2σp
F (DD, µp , σp ) = √ exp
σp 2π

(5.9)

As concluded in Sec. 5.2, the unreliable responses come from challenges generating
smaller DDgolden , either negative or positive. Thus, even not knowing the exact
unreliable range, we can still apply Quantile function to quantify it with Alg. 8. If
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denoting Φ−1 (dr)(dr ∈ (0, 1)) as the Probit function of standard normal distribution,
we determine the range of delay differences to discard using Eq. 5.10 (as steps 6 and
7 in Alg. 8), where dr stands for the ratio of challenges that should be discarded
from the CRP database of each PUF. The value of dr provides a tradeoff in which
selecting a larger value of dr to discard more challenges will result in more reliable
PUF operation, but a smaller space of challenges that can be applied to the PUF.

F −1 (dr) = µp + σp Φ−1 (dr)
5.4.1

(5.10)

Validation under environmental noise

The qualified challenges (DDmodel 6∈ [DDmin , DDmax ]) are applied on PUFs, and
their responses are compared with golden database, the result is shown as Fig. 5.7.
With training size increasing, the values learned for DDmin and DDmax become more
accurate, and fewer challenges need to be discarded to achieve the same reliability.
The runtime to train the SVM model is modest; when using a training set of 4000
CRPs, training takes only 0.38 seconds.
Applications: As Machine Learning modeling is mostly considered in attacking
PUFs, our main concern in this work is to show that this technique can also be
applied for constructive purpose. Nevertheless, to use the technique in this work
for reliability improvement, one should consider whether an adversary observing the
reliable challenges that are applied to the PUF, would be able to use knowledge about
which challenges are reliable to train a model that can predict the PUF response. To
the best of our knowledge, this is not a question that has yet been addressed in the
PUF community, and would be an interesting direction for future work.

5.5

Summary

In this chapter, we analyzed the causes of PUF unreliability. A machine-learning
approach is utilized to model the delay difference on a given PUF. Based on the
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0.98
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Figure 5.7: Validation under aging and environmental noise, across all of the simulated
PUF instances. Trade-off between training size and discarded ratio can be seen in
the figure. A larger dr is conservative and can compensate for the lower quality delay
predictions of a model trained from a smaller training set.

prediction of delay difference from each challenge, we discard challenges that are
likely to be unreliable. We validate our technique with a large data set, using both
environmental noise and aging impacted simulations. Our method is demonstrated as
an effective new technique for reliable PUF operation. Future work will explore the
applicability to other PUF architectures.
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CHAPTER 6
A CLOCKLESS SEQUENTIAL PUF WITH
AUTONOMOUS MAJORITY VOTING

Techniques to ensure the reliability of PUF-based keys have associated costs in
energy, area, and time. These costs must be minimized in order for PUFs to find
practical application in resource-constrained scenarios. In this chapter, we propose
and evaluate a new style of PUF that improves reliability by autonomously performing
majority voting. The novelty of this design, and the source of its efficiency, is that the
sequential majority voting happens using a self-timed circuit without orchestration
by a global clock. We show that the proposed design can be instantiated to achieve
different tradeoffs in energy versus bit-error-rate, and area versus latency.

6.1

Introduction

As we predicted in previous chapters, noise is an unwanted issue PUF outputs
typically have a bit error rate of a few percent. Circuit level reliability techniques and
error correcting codes are therefore used to produce reliable keys from the slightlyunreliable PUFs. In this chapter we propose a PUF that has the external interface of a
simple weak PUF, but has an internal structure that autonomously performs majority
voting to improve reliability. The specific contributions of this work as follows:
• We describe a novel clockless sequential PUF structure that performs autonomous
majority voting.
• We evaluate using circuit simulation the reliability of the proposed PUF across
a range of supply voltages and temperatures.
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• We explore the tradeoffs of energy and reliability that can be accomplished using
different parameterizations of the proposed PUF.

6.2

Related Work

Secret key style PUFs generate n-bit outputs using n-instantiations of logically
identical cells, each of which generates a single output bit. The cells used for these
PUFs resemble memory cells, and in many cases actually are repurposed memory cells.
Such a cell has two stable states. The PUF output bit is generated by driving the
cell to an unstable state and letting it transition to a stable state that is determined
by process variation of the cell. Perhaps the best known PUF of this sort is based
on the power-up state of SRAM cells [37, 31]; at power-up, an SRAM cell with both
state nodes discharged becomes unstable and transitions to one of its two stable
states. Other examples of cross-coupled PUF cells are ones based on resettable NOR
latches [101], the butterfly PUF based on cross-coupled latches [53], and PUFs based
on flip-flops [66] or sense amplifiers [9]. Yamamoto et al. [122] propose a PUF based
on RS latches with inputs tied together, and this basic circuit is also a component of
our proposed PUF. However, the manner in which the RS latch is used in our design
differs substantially. Yamamoto’s work is based on the location of RS latches with
random output bits.
Secret keys used for cryptography must be highly repeatable over time, and given
that PUFs are based on physical processes that are susceptible to noise, mechanisms are
required to bridge the gap from unreliable circuits to reliable keys. These mechanisms
can be broken into circuit-level techniques operating at the level of individual PUF bits,
and error correction happening at the word level across many bits in aggregate. The
two types of mechanisms can be used together, such that the circuit-level techniques
reduce the bit-error-rate, and the reduced number of errors are then corrected using
coding.
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6.2.1

Reliability Enhancements in Secret Key PUFs

Bit-level reliability enhancements for PUFs decrease the error rate by reducing
the impact of noise on the PUF outputs. Cells that are highly biased toward one
output are largely immune to the small influence of noise, and bit errors happen in
PUF cells that are approximately metastable. Directed accelerated aging techniques
measure PUF outputs after manufacturing, and then reinforce cell tendencies using
aging to increase the bias of each cell toward its more probable output [10]. Dark-bit
masking [6] refers to pre-characterizing cells to identify and then mask out unreliable
bits. Dark-bit masking can either be applied as a post-silicon testing step, or performed
on-line in the field by evaluating the PUF under various stress conditions [72, 96].

6.2.2

Temporal Majority Voting

Especially relevant to the work in this chapter is temporal majority voting [6, 72].
In majority voting, a cell is evaluated n times in sequence, and the overall output is
decided according to which value occurs in a majority of the n trials. Larger values
of n improve the reliability of the PUF output. Effectively, majority voting across
n trials counteracts the influence of noise that can cause a cell to produce its less
likely value in a single trial. For example, consider a cell that has probability 0.1 of
producing output value 0, and probability 0.9 of producing output value 1; this cell
can be considered as having a error rate of 0.1 and nominal output value of 1. Using
p to denote the error rate before majority voting, the error rate of the same bit after

P
majority voting across n output observations is pbit = ni= n+1 ni pi (1 − p)n−i . The
2

relationship between pbit and p for different values of n is shown in Fig. 6.1. For a bit
as described above (p = 0.1), the error rate after majority voting is pbit = 0.028 for
n = 3, and pbit = 0.0027 for n = 7.
Note that majority voting will not improve reliability of a cell that is equally likely
to produce either output value (p = 0.5), or a cell for which the more likely output

96

changes according to temperature or another environmental parameter. Reliability of
these cells must be addressed through one of the other reliability mechanism such as

pbit (error rate after voting)

dark-bit masking, directed aging, or error correcting codes with helper data.

0.5

n=1
n=3
n=7
n=15
n=31
n=63

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
p (error rate before voting)

Figure 6.1: The impact of majority voting on reliability of a single bit. For any
probability p of an output error in a single trial, pbit is the corresponding probability
of having an output error after using majority voting across n trials. Increasing n
decreases the probability of error, except for cells with p equal to 0.5.

6.2.3

Error Correction using Helper Data

Reliability enhancements such as majority voting are complementary to the use of
error correction. An example of error correction using the code-offset construction [47,
20] is shown in Fig. 6.2. An arbitrary secret key K is chosen for each PUF at enrollment
and then encoded to a codeword C(K) that is XORed with PUF response W to
generate helper data. The unknowability of W prevents helper data C(K) ⊕ W from
revealing secret C(K), so helper data need not be protected against invasive attack
and can be stored using any non-volatile memory, fuses, or antifuses. To regenerate
the secret key in the field, a PUF produces a value W 0 that may differ slightly from
W due to noise or environmental variations. Response W 0 is XORed with the helper
data to produce a version of codeword C(K) that is corrupted by the difference
between W and W 0 . If the number of errors that can be corrected by the chosen code
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exceeds the Hamming distance between W and W 0 , then key K is correctly recovered
by decoding the noisy codeword. Note that more reliable PUFs will have smaller
Hamming distances between W and W 0 , and this reduces the number of errors that
must be correctable by the error correcting code.

PUF

W’

+

C(K) ⊕ W ⊕ W’

Decode
C-1

Key K

C(K) ⊕ W
Helper Data
(antifuse)

Figure 6.2: PUF-based secret key generation using helper data for error correction.
The helper data is generated during a one-time enrollment process and is fixed over
the life of the PUF.

6.3

Design of a Clockless Sequential PUF

In this work we propose a clockless sequential PUF that performs majority voting
as part of its sequential behavior. Fig. 6.4 shows the proposed PUF design; each bit
of PUF output corresponds one instantiation of this design. The design uses two
LFSRs to count oscillations on circuit nodes, and the PUF output is determined
according to which LFSR is first to reach its final count. Because each oscillation
is effectively a PUF observation, producing an output based on oscillation counts
constitutes autonomous voting without orchestration by a global clock. In other words,
the sequential behavior of the PUF is unrelated to the system clock, and in some
configurations can occur within a single system clock. The evaluation of the PUF is
initiated by asserting EVAL. When the PUF has completed its sequential evolution,
signal READY is asserted, and the output is read from OUT. Note that READY can
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be neglected if sufficiently conservative time is waited between asserting EVAL and
reading OUT.

6.3.1

Principle of Operation

Each PUF output bit is determined by the variation-induced behavior of an 8transistor cross-coupled SR latch with its two inputs tied together. As shown in the
shaded box in Fig. 6.4a, we denote the input X and the outputs Y1 and Y0. The
SR latch is stable only when {X,Y1,Y0} takes the values {0,1,1}, {1,1,0} or {1,0,1}.
If these signals have any other combination of values, the latch is unstable and its
outputs will immediately transition to a stable latch configuration; for example {0,1,0}
would transition to {0,1,1}.
Our design implements feedback around the SR latch to ensure that there are no
stable states of the overall PUF circuit during evaluation, and furthermore that there
are two possible modes of oscillation. During evaluation, the RUN signal input to
the AND3 gate is high, so that X is a logical AND of delayed versions of Y1 and Y0.
Because of this logical AND, each stable state {X,Y1,Y0} will lead after a propagation
delay to a successor state {X’,Y1,Y0}, such that X’ = AND(Y1,Y0). These successor
states are all unstable and will immediately transition to a stable state and then again
propagate back to an unstable state, continuing in this way indefinitely. This constant
evolution of state is shown in Fig. 6.3, where all unstable states are shown as unshaded.
The variation-sensitive state transition of the PUF is the choice of stable state that
follows unstable state {1,1,1}. The state of the circuit will never settle until RUN is
deasserted. If the evolution of circuit state tends to follow the upper loop of Fig. 6.3,
then node Y1, and OSC1 in Fig. 6.4, will tend to oscillate. If the evolution of circuit
state follows the lower loop, then Y0 and OSC0 will oscillate.

99

{0,0,1}

X↓

delay

Y1↓

Y1↑
{0,1,1}

delay X↑

{1,1,1}

Y0↑
{0,1,0}

{1,0,1}

variationdependent
transition
Y0↓

delay

X↓

{1,1,0}

Figure 6.3: The evolution of SR latch state when embedded in the feedback circuit of
Fig. 6.4a. The three values marking each state are assignments to {X,Y1,Y0}. The
states that are shaded grey would be stable states if not for feedback. The unshaded
states occur transiently when latch outputs propagate back to change the value of
X. The successor state to {1,1,1} is determined by process variation and, to a lesser
extent, by noise.

6.3.2

Linear Feedback Shift Register as Counter

To meet strict timing constraints, An LFSR instead of a binary counter is used to
count oscillations. In any digital circuit, the delay of the critical path must be less
than the clock period, so that the combinational logic will stabilize to its final value
before the next clock edge comes. If this condition is not met, then a timing violation
is said to occur, and the value that gets stored on the clock edge is unpredictable. In
our circuit (Fig. 6.4a), the clock signal to each counter is in reality an oscillating signal
from the PUF. The time between successive rising edges on the LFSR clock input is
the oscillation period of PUF node OSC1 or OSC0, and is therefore determined by
the time for a signal to propagate twice through an AND3 gate, a NAND2 gate, and
two inverters. The oscillation periods of these nodes are shorter than the delay of
carry chains in adder circuits, so adders cannot be used to count oscillations without
causing timing violations. We resolve this concern by using an LFSR, which has a
much shorter critical path delay, for the counter. Because the LFSR critical path delay
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is shorter than the oscillations of the PUF nodes (Fig. 6.8), it can be clocked using
the oscillating PUF nodes without causing timing violations. An LFSR has previously
been used as a round counter in the the KATAN block cipher by DeCanniere et al. [16];
as in our case here, DeCanniere chooses to use an LFSR for its short critical path,
small implementation, and low power. An alternative solution to using LFSR counters
is to lengthen the PUF oscillation period by increasing the propagation delay of the
feedback structure, but this is avoided because it would incur area and power costs.
The size of the LFSR, in number of bits, is a parameter of the PUF that can be
chosen at design time. In Fig. 6.4b we show a 3-bit counter as one particular choice
of LFSR size. For any given LFSR size n, a maximum length polynomial must be
chosen so that the LFSR will have 2n − 1 non-repeating states, and therefore 2n − 2
transitions between the initial state and the final state. The implications of LFSR
size are discussed in the evaluation sections.
The proposed PUF architecture can be built from an industry gate library, and
the synthesized PUF with 3-bit LFSR counters is shown in Fig. 6.4c. The area is 43
µm2 in a 45nm technology node. The schematics of Fig. 6.4 imply that each PUF
has two dedicated LFSR counters, and in this case all PUFs can be evaluated in
parallel. It is also possible to design the PUF so that LFSR counters are shared across
multiple PUF bits; PUF bits that share counters would be evaluated serially. Sharing
of counters or other support circuits would reduce area cost but increase latency due
to serialization. In this work, we assume the fully parallel solution, where each PUF
has its own dedicated LFSR counters. Note that the area overhead of counters is
not unique to our design and in fact any majority voting scheme must similarly have
counters.
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(a) Overall PUF circuit schematic including two LFSR counters
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== final
count
== final
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LFSR
counter
counter

(b) Detailed schematic view of 3-bit LFSR counter

(c) Layout view of PUF with 3-bit LFSR counters (M1-M4 layers shown)

Figure 6.4: Schematic and layout view of the proposed PUF. The SR latch and
feedback circuit together induce an oscillating behavior that favors OSC1 or OSC0.
An LFSR advances its state at each rising edge of OSC1 or OSC0 to count the
oscillations of that signal. When one LFSR reaches its final count value, RUN is
deasserted, and the output is ready to read out.
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Figure 6.5: The transient waveforms of a single execution of the proposed PUF. The
EVAL signal starts the evaluation by initializing the LFSR counter states (see Fig. 6.4),
and everything thereafter happens autonomously. Once a counter (counter 1 in this
case) reaches its sixth and final state, the oscillation is terminated, and the output is
ready. In this example the PUF output is 1 because counter 1 reached its final state.

6.4

Experimental Validation

We evaluate the proposed PUF design by simulating the circuit at different supply
voltages and temperatures.

6.4.1

Simulation Methodology

The results in this chapter are obtained from circuit simulation using Synopsys
HSPICE, version E-2010.

6.4.1.1

Transistor Models and Sizing

Transistor and interconnect models are from the freely-available Predictive Technology Model (PTM). More specifically, the transistor models are PTM models for a
45 nm process [13]. The circuit behavior is sensitive to the transistors in the inverters
and the NAND2 gates in the SR latch, so the relevant parameters for these transistors
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are shown in Tab. 6.1. The mean value µ for each variation-impacted parameter is
the nominal value in the transistor model. The standard deviation (σ) of threshold
voltage (vth0) depends on transistor size, and is calculated from Eq. 6.1 using a value
of 1.8 mV µm for AV T [80]. The 3σ of transistor length is set to be 10% of the
overall transistor length based on existing literature [4], and this is implemented using
transistor parameter lint1 as shown in Tab. 6.1.
AV T
σV T = √
WL
Sizing
W [nm] L [nm]
NAND2
INV

NMOS
PMOS
NMOS
PMOS

180
180
90
180

50
50
50
50

(6.1)

Process Variation
vth0 [mV] lint [nm]
µ
σ µ
σ
468 19.0 5
1.7
-491 19.0 5
1.7
468 26.8 5
1.7
-491 19.0 5
1.7

Table 6.1: Transistor sizes and process variation parameters.

6.4.1.2

Noise

To evaluate the ability of majority voting to mitigate noise, we adopt two noise
models in our simulation: flicker noise and channel thermal noise. Flicker noise is a
frequency dependent noise caused by charge fluctuation in oxide traps, and results in
fluctuations of both mobile carrier numbers and mobilities in the channel. Channel
thermal noise reflects voltage fluctuations due to the random motion of electrons.
The BSIM42 parameters f noimod and tnoimod implement flicker and thermal noise
1

lint, standing for internal length, represents the difference between nominal and effective transistor
length
2

BSIM4 model is based on the industry standard efforts of the Compact Modeling Counsel and
the BSIM modeling group at UC Berkeley.
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respectively;3 noise is therefore modeled on all transistors in the circuit. The simulation
results of Fig. 6.6 obtained using the described variation and noise models shows
the clear separation of between-class and within-class Hamming distances. The large
between-class Hamming distance implies high uniqueness, and the relatively small
within-class Hamming distance implies high reliability.

occurence

1500
1000

between class
within class

500
0
0

50
100
150
Hamming distance (bits)

200

Figure 6.6: Hamming distances of the proposed PUF with 7-bit LFSR counters.
Within-class data points are two outputs from the same PUF, and between class are
from different PUFs. In addition to noise, the temperature is assigned randomly from
the range of 0◦ C to 100◦ C in each trial for this plot.

6.4.2

Reliability

The reliability of the proposed PUF is evaluated at the nominal supply voltage of
1.1 V, and at voltages of 0.825 V and 0.55 V (Fig. 6.7). On each plot of Fig. 6.7, each
line shows reliability across temperature of PUFs with a given size LFSR; correctness
of the PUF output is determined by comparing each output value against an output
from the same PUF at 25◦ C. Increasing the size of the LFSR improves the reliability of
the PUF because it increases the number of majority voting trials that occur internally
before an output is produced when one of the LFSR counters reaches its final value.
3

the values assigned to the three parameters comprising f noimod are noia = 6.25e41, noib =
3.125e26, noic = 8.75; the values assigned to the parameters comprising tnoimod are ntnoi = 1, tnoia
= 1.5e6 and tnoib = 3.5e6
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(b) Reduced Vdd of 0.825 V
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(c) Reduced Vdd of 0.55 V

Figure 6.7: Reliability evaluation of the proposed PUF across temperatures for various
widths of LFSR counter. The results are averaged based on 1,000,000 PUF instances.
For the result labeled as a 1-bit counter, no majority voting is performed.
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Figure 6.8: The distribution of LFSR critical path delays and PUF oscillation periods
at three different supply voltages. Because LFSR critical path delay is shorter that
the oscillation period even with process variation, the LFSR circuit can use the PUF
oscillations as a clock without having timing violations.
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6.4.3

Error Correction

Error correcting codes are used to correct PUF output bit errors to produce reliable
secret keys (see Sec. 6.2.3). The number of PUF output bits needed to generate a
key is significantly larger than the key size, and this number increases when more
errors must be correctable. For example, Guajardo et al. [32] show that reliably
generating a 228-bit key requires 6,128 PUF output bits when conservatively assuming
a bit-error-rate of 0.16. Our use of majority voting in the proposed PUF reduces
bit-error-rate and reduces the number of PUF output bits used to generate a key.
There are at least three benefits to reducing the required number of PUF output bits:
1) the area cost of PUF circuitry is proportional to its number of output bits; 2) the
amount of helper data (see Fig. 6.2) is also proportional to its number of output bits;
and 3) the area and energy cost of the error correction algorithm increases with the
number of bits used.
In this section, we quantify how the reliability improvement of the proposed PUF
reduces the burden of error correction. We focus on binary BCH codes, which are a
set of codes that can be adapted for their block size and for the number of correctable
errors in each block. As the number of correctable errors per block increases, the
number of useful bits in each block decreases.
For a PUF with bit error rate pbit , we search for the BCH code that uses the
minimum number of PUF output bits to generate a 2,048-bit key that will be incorrect
fewer than once per billion uses. We find an optimal code for different values of pbit
by using exhaustive search of all BCH codes that have block length less than 511 bits.
For a BCH code described by parameters b (block size in bits), k (useful key bits per
block), and t (correctable errors per block), the following procedure calculates the
probability (denoted pkey ) of producing an incorrect 2,048-bit key. First, the probability
(denoted pblock ) of having an uncorrectable error in a single block is calculated as
the probability of having more than t erroneous bits in the block (Eq. 6.2), under
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the assumption that bit errors are independent and identically distributed. Then,
given that nblocks = d2, 048/ke blocks are needed to generate the entire key, the key
error probability pkey is calculated as the probability that not all blocks are error-free
(Eq. 6.3). If the pkey of a particular BCH code is less than 1E-9, then the BCH code is
deemed suitably reliable for correcting a bit error rate of pbit , and will be considered
optimal if the number of bits used (b ∗ nblocks ) is fewest among all BCH codes that
satisfy the same condition of pkey being less than 1E-9.

pblock

b  
X
b i
=
pbit (1 − pbit )b−i
i
i=t+1

(6.2)

pkey = 1 − (1 − pblock )nblocks

(6.3)

Based on the analysis described in the preceding paragraph, Table 6.2 shows the
optimal BCH code for the pbit values from different LFSR counter sizes. For each
LFSR size, the value of pbit is the bit error rate obtained in the worst-case scenario of
100◦ C and 0.55 V (see Fig. 6.7c). The improved reliability that comes from increasing
LFSR size has a large impact on the number of PUF bits needed to generate the key.
Number of
LFSR bits
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

pbit
0.0519
0.0468
0.0437
0.0353
0.0290
0.0257
0.0221

Optimal BCH code PUF bits
b
k
t
required
255 47
42
11,220
511 103
61
10,220
511 121
58
8,687
511 157
51
7,154
511 184
45
6,132
511 211
41
5,110
511 229
38
4,599

Percent of
bits saved
8.9%
22.6%
36.2%
45.3%
54.5%
59.0%

Table 6.2: BCH codes that generate a 2,048-bit key using the minimal number of PUF
outputs for different values of pbit . The BCH codes are chosen such that the key will
be generated incorrectly less than once per billion uses. The value of pbit in each row
corresponds to the observed bit-error-rate at 100◦ C at 0.55 V supply. Each BCH code
block uses b bits to encode k key bits with capability to correct up to t errors.
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6.4.4

Energy

Changing the LFSR counter size trades energy-per-bit against reliability. For an
n-bit LFSR, a maximal length polynomial is chosen so that the evaluation will end
after one counter has experienced 2n − 2 rising transitions on its oscillating input.
When considering both counters, the total number of oscillations in the evaluation is
between 2n − 2 and 2(2n − 2) − 1. The energy of a PUF evaluation is roughly linear
in the number of oscillations and therefore exponential in LFSR size n (Fig. 6.9).
Once the LFSR becomes sufficiently large, the small reliability gains from additional
majority voting trials come at a high energy cost. In addition to changing the LFSR
size at design time, another strategy to reduce energy-per-bit is lowering the operating
voltage of the PUF. Note that both increasing LFSR size and lowering supply voltage
increase the time required to complete each evaluation of the PUF.
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Figure 6.9: The energy-per-response-bit increases roughly linearly with the number of
oscillations, which is exponential in the number of LFSR counter bits. Meanwhile, the
reliability increases with the size of the LFSR counter due to the increased number of
majority voting trials performed.
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6.5

Summary

This chapter proposes a novel PUF that uses autonomous majority voting without
orchestration by a clock. The proposed design is parameterizable by its LFSR
counter size, and this allows reliability to be traded off against energy and area. Our
experiments show that the improved reliability of the design translates to as much
as 59% savings in the number PUF bits needed for key generation when combined
with error correcting codes. An interesting direction for future work is to minimize
total energy of PUF key generation when using this design together with both dark
bit masking and error correction.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS

Driven by Moore’s law, semiconductor industry has experienced continuous physical
scaling in the past few decades. This advancement greatly facilitates the development
of electronic devices like smart phones, tablets, but also proposes new challenges for
hardware security researchers. This dissertation presents some of our recent work
in advancing secure CMOS computation with intrinsic functions: i.e., the so-called
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). Three topics are studied: nanometer-scale
process variations, Machine Learning based modeling and noise sensitivity.
Chapter 1 of this dissertation lists the challenge and opportunities in nanometer
cryptographic circuit design. We predict that though process variations are detrimental
to conventional circuit design, PUFs have been proposed as a viable solution to harness
the unpredictable nature of process variations for security applications. Terminologies
like challenge-response pairs (CRPs), reliability, uniqueness and uniformity are defined
in this chapter.
Since PUFs leverage microscopic process variations, thus are sensitive to environmental noise like slight temperature or supply voltage fluctuations. Due to such
sensitivity, a PUF may not produce consistent response for the same challenge under
different environmental conditions. To address the reliability of currently proposed
PUF primitives, two highly reliable PUF mechanisms on two common seen memory
architectures, SRAM and D Flip-flop are proposed in Chapter 2 and 3. To improve
the efficiency of our propose PUF mechanisms, we combined algorithm like binary
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search, advanced Machine Learning method like Artificial Neural Network (ANN) in
these two works.
Bistable Ring (BR) PUF is a newly proposed but promising hardware security
primitive in PUF family. In Chapter 4, we studied the ML modeling resilience of BR
PUF and its derived architecture TBR PUF. We evaluate the security of Bistable Ring
PUF by applying different attacking models and methods, besides the proposed attacks
in other literatures, we propose a novel model based on Support Vector Machine
(SVM). XORing method is employed to enhance the attack resilience of single BR
PUF, we demonstrate that XORed BR PUF is beyond the reach of current known
attacking models, thus is secure.
Environmental noise including temperature variance and supply voltage fluctuation
is a known cause for PUFs reliability problem. However, device aging as a widely
studied issue in hardware deign, was rarely considered in previous literatures on
PUFs. Chapter 5 addresses these two causes of unreliability: transient unreliability
caused by environmental noise, and persistent unreliability caused by device aging.
We constructively apply ML modeling method, and use the models to predict and
then discard CRPs that will be unreliable with respect to noise and aging on a given
PUF instance.
In Chapter 6, we propose and evaluate a new style of PUF that improves reliability
by autonomously performing majority voting. The novelty of this design, and the
source of its efficiency, is that the sequential majority voting happens using a self-timed
circuit without orchestration by a global clock. We show that the proposed design
can be instantiated to achieve different tradeoffs in energy versus bit-error-rate, and
area versus latency.
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Marten. Playpuf: Programmable logically erasable pufs for forward and backward
secure key management.
[46] Johnson, Ian. Supercharging the embedded device: Arm cortex-m7.
[47] Juels, Ari, and Wattenberg, Martin. A fuzzy commitment scheme. In Proceedings
of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security (1999),
ACM, ACM Press, pp. 28–36.
[48] Kelton, W David, and Law, Averill M. Simulation modeling and analysis.
McGraw Hill Boston, 2000.

119

[49] Kerckhoffs, Auguste. La cryptographie militaire. University Microfilms, 1978.
[50] Khan, Seyab, Hamdioui, Said, Kukner, Halil, Raghavan, Praveen, and Catthoor,
Francky. Incorporating parameter variations in bti impact on nano-scale logical
gates analysis. In Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology
Systems (DFT), 2012 IEEE International Symposium on (2012), IEEE, pp. 158–
163.
[51] Kim, Inyoung, Maiti, Abhranil, Nazhandali, Leyla, Schaumont, Patrick, Vivekraja, Vignesh, and Zhang, Huaiye. From statistics to circuits: Foundations for
future physical unclonable functions. In Towards Hardware-Intrinsic Security.
Springer, 2010, pp. 55–78.
[52] Kumar, Animesh, Qin, Huifang, Ishwar, Prakash, Rabaey, Jan, and Ramchandran, Kannan. Fundamental data retention limits in sram standby – experimental
results. In Quality Electronic Design, 2008. ISQED 2008. 9th International
Symposium on (2008), IEEE, pp. 92–97.
[53] Kumar, S S, Guajardo, J, Maes, R, Schrijen, G J, and Tuyls, P. The butterfly
PUF protecting IP on every FPGA. Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust,
2008. HOST 2008. IEEE International Workshop on (2008), 67–70.
[54] Lai, Ya-Chun, Huang, Shi-Yu, and Hsu, Hsuan-Jung. Resilient Self-VDD -Tuning
Scheme With Speed-Margining for Low-Power SRAM. IEEE Journal of SolidState Circuits 44, 10 (Oct. 2009), 2817–2823.
[55] Lee, Jae W, Lim, Daihyun, Gassend, Blaise, Suh, G Edward, Van Dijk, Marten,
and Devadas, Srinivas. A technique to build a secret key in integrated circuits
for identification and authentication applications. In VLSI Circuits, 2004. Digest
of Technical Papers. Symposium on, pp. 176–179.

120

[56] Lee, Jae W, Lim, Daihyun, Gassend, Blaise, Suh, G Edward, Van Dijk, Marten,
and Devadas, Srinivas. A technique to build a secret key in integrated circuits
for identification and authentication applications. In VLSI Circuits, 2004. Digest
of Technical Papers. 2004 Symposium on (2004), IEEE, pp. 176–179.
[57] Lee, J.W., Lim, Daihyun, Gassend, B., Suh, G.E., van Dijk, M., and Devadas,
S. A technique to build a secret key in integrated circuits for identification and
authentication applications. In 2004 Symposium on VLSI Circuits. Digest of
Technical Papers. (June 2004), pp. 176 – 179.
[58] Li, Shuo, and Salthouse, Christopher. Digital-to-time converter for fluorescence
lifetime imaging. In Instrumentation and Measurement Technology Conference
(I2MTC), 2013 IEEE International (2013), IEEE, pp. 894–897.
[59] Lim, Daihyun. Extracting secret keys from integrated circuits, MSc Thesis,
2004.
[60] Lofstrom, K., Daasch, W.R., and Taylor, D. IC identification circuit using device
mismatch. In IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference. Digest of
Technical Papers. (2000), pp. 372 –373.
[61] Lofstrom, Keith, Daasch, W Robert, and Taylor, Donald. Ic identification circuit
using device mismatch. In Solid-State Circuits Conference, 2000. Digest of
Technical Papers, IEEE International (2000), IEEE, pp. 372–373.
[62] Lorenz, Dominik, Georgakos, Georg, and Schlichtmann, Ulf. Aging analysis of
circuit timing considering nbti and hci. In On-Line Testing Symposium, 2009.
IOLTS 2009. 15th IEEE International (2009), IEEE, pp. 3–8.
[63] Maes, Roel. An accurate probabilistic reliability model for silicon pufs. In
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems-CHES 2013. Springer, 2013,
pp. 73–89.
121

[64] Maes, Roel, Tuyls, Pim, and Verbauwhede, Ingrid. Low-overhead implementation
of a soft decision helper data algorithm for sram pufs. In Cryptographic Hardware
and Embedded Systems-CHES.
[65] Maes, Roel, Tuyls, Pim, and Verbauwhede, Ingrid. Intrinsic pufs from flip-flops
on reconfigurable devices. In 3rd Benelux workshop on information and system
security (WISSec 2008) (2008), vol. 17.
[66] Maes, Roel, Tuyls, Pim, and Verbauwhede, Ingrid. Intrinsic PUFs from flip-flops
on reconfigurable devices. In 3rd Benelux workshop on information and system
security (WISSec 2008) (2008), vol. 17.
[67] Maes, Roel, Tuyls, Pim, and Verbauwhede, Ingrid. Low-Overhead Implementation of a Soft Decision Helper Data Algorithm for SRAM PUFs. Cryptographic
Hardware and Embedded Systems (2009).
[68] Maes, Roel, Tuyls, Pim, and Verbauwhede, Ingrid. A Soft Decision Helper Data
Algorithm for SRAM PUFs. In Information Theory, 2009. ISIT 2009. IEEE
International Symposium on (2009), IEEE, pp. 2101–2105.
[69] Maes, Roel, Van Herrewege, Anthony, and Verbauwhede, Ingrid. Pufky: A fully
functional puf-based cryptographic key generator. Cryptographic Hardware and
Embedded Systems (2012).
[70] Majzoobi, Mehrdad, Koushanfar, Farinaz, and Potkonjak, Miodrag. Lightweight
secure pufs. In Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/ACM International Conference
on Computer-Aided Design, pp. 670–673.
[71] Majzoobi, Mehrdad, Koushanfar, Farinaz, and Potkonjak, Miodrag. Lightweight
secure PUFs. In Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/ACM International Conference
on Computer-Aided Design (2008), IEEE Press, pp. 670–673.

122

[72] Mathew, S K, Satpathy, S K, Anders, M A, Kaul, H, Hsu, S K, Agarwal, A,
Chen, G K, Parker, R J, Krishnamurthy, R K, and De, V. A 0.19pJ/b PVTvariation-tolerant hybrid physically unclonable function circuit for 100% stable
secure key generation in 22nm CMOS. In Solid-State Circuits Conference Digest
of Technical Papers (ISSCC), 2014 IEEE International (2014), pp. 278–279.
[73] Mathew, Sanu K, Satpathy, Sudhir K, Anders, Mark A, Kaul, Himanshu, Hsu,
Steven K, Agarwal, Amit, Chen, Gregory K, Parker, Rachael J, Krishnamurthy,
Ram K, and De, Vivek. A 0.19 pj/b pvt-variation-tolerant hybrid physically
unclonable function circuit for 100% stable secure key generation in 22nm cmos.
In Solid-State Circuits Conference Digest of Technical Papers (ISSCC), 2014
IEEE International (2014), IEEE, pp. 278–279.
[74] Mathew, Sanu K, Satpathy, Sudhir K, Anders, Mark A, Kaul, Himanshu, Hsu,
Steven K, Agarwal, Amit, Chen, Gregory K, Parker, Rachael J, Krishnamurthy,
Ram K, and De, Vivek. 16.2 a 0.19 pj/b pvt-variation-tolerant hybrid physically
unclonable function circuit for 100% stable secure key generation in 22nm
cmos. In Solid-State Circuits Conference Digest of Technical Papers, IEEE
International (2014), IEEE, pp. 278–279.
[75] Nourivand, Afshin, Al-Khalili, Asim J, and Savaria, Yvon. Postsilicon Tuning of
Standby Supply Voltage in SRAMs to Reduce Yield Losses Due to Parametric
Data-Retention Failures. IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration
(VLSI) Systems, 1 (2011), 29–41.
[76] Omega Engineering, Inc. OSXL450 Infrared Non-Contact Thermometer Manual,
Last viewed Oct 27, 2014.
[77] Pappu, Ravikanth, Recht, Ben, Taylor, Jason, and Gershenfeld, Neil. Physical
one-way functions. Science 297, 5589 (2002), 2026–2030.

123

[78] Prabhu, P, Akel, A, Grupp, L, Yu, WK, Suh, G, Kan, Edwin, and Swanson,
Steven. Extracting Device Fingerprints from Flash Memory by Exploiting
Physical Variations. Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Trust
and Trustworthy Computing (2011).
[79] Qazi, Masood, Tikekar, Mehul, Dolecek, Lara, Shah, Devavrat, and Chandrakasan, Anantha. Loop flattening & spherical sampling: Highly efficient model
reduction techniques for sram yield analysis. In Proceedings of the Conference
on Design, Automation and Test in Europe (2010), pp. 801–806.
[80] Qazi, Masood, Tikekar, Mehul, Dolecek, Lara, Shah, Devavrat, and Chandrakasan, Anantha. Loop flattening & spherical sampling: highly efficient model
reduction techniques for SRAM yield analysis. In DATE ’10: Proceedings of the
Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe (Mar. 2010).
[81] Qin, Hulfang, Cao, Yu, Markovic, D, Vladimirescu, A, and Rabaey, J. SRAM
leakage suppression by minimizing standby supply voltage. In 5th International
Symposium on Quality Electronic Design. (2004), pp. 55–60.
[82] Qu, Gang, and Yin, Chi-En. Temperature-aware cooperative ring oscillator puf.
In Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, IEEE 2009.
[83] Raghavan Kumar, Xiaolin Xu, Wayne Burleson Sami Rosenblatt, and Kirihata,
Toshiaki. Physically unclonable functions: A window into cmos process variations.
Circuits and Systems for Security and Privacy (2016), 183 –244.
[84] Rahman, Tauhidur, Forte, Domenic, Fahrny, Jim, and Tehranipoor, Mohammad.
Aro-puf: an aging-resistant ring oscillator puf design. In Proceedings of the
conference on Design, Automation & Test in Europe (2014), European Design
and Automation Association, p. 69.

124

[85] Rahmati, Amir, Hicks, Matthew, Holcomb, Daniel E, and Fu, Kevin. Probable
cause: the deanonymizing effects of approximate dram. In Proceedings of the
42nd Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (2015), ACM,
pp. 604–615.
[86] Rahmati, Amir, Salajegheh, Mastooreh, Holcomb, Dan, Sorber, Jacob, Burleson,
Wayne P, and Fu, Kevin. Tardis: Time and remanence decay in sram to implement secure protocols on embedded devices without clocks. In Proceedings of the
21st USENIX conference on Security symposium (2012), USENIX Association,
pp. 36–36.
[87] Ransford, Benjamin, Clark, Shane, Salajegheh, Mastooreh, and Fu, Kevin.
Getting things done on computational RFIDs with energy-aware checkpointing
and voltage-aware scheduling. In USENIX Workshop on Power Aware Computing
and Systems (HotPower) (December 2008).
[88] Rosenblatt, S, Chellappa, S, Cestero, A, Robson, N, Kirihata, T, and Iyer,
S S. A Self-Authenticating Chip Architecture Using an Intrinsic Fingerprint of
Embedded DRAM. Solid-State Circuits, IEEE Journal of, 99 (2013), 1–10.
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